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Upside-down faces: A review of the effect of in- version upon face recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 79, 471–491. The World and Words of Mind Bertram F. Malle Department of Psychology University of Oregon What can be more fascinating, more central to psy- chology than the problem of capturing mental states with words—the magical relation between mind and language. Some of the brightest thinkers, perhaps even all significant philosophers of the 20th century, have at some point grappled with the question of how we are able to speak about the unobservable sphere of the mental, how we can actually refer to states of the mind. Sabini and Silver’s target article revolves around this question and thus draws attention to an essential prob- lem of psychology that is all too often treated lightly or ignored. In fact, for a good 2 decades, Sabini and Silver have studied issues concerning the general problem of mind and language, and for that alone they should be commended. I admit that in many cases I don’t agree with their theories, their proposed solutions to the problems; but much more important is that they are working on problems that we as psychologists should care about. In this target article, Sabini and Silver (this issue) take a step back from the specific analyses they have offered over the years about the nature of shame, guilt, pride, and related emotions. They propose instead a hy- pothesis that should hold for all emotion terms, pre- sumably for all mental state terms. This hypothesis is that the mental state lexicon is richer than the reality of mental state experiences. More concretely, they sug- gest that there are “fewer emotional states than there are emotion words in the language” because there are several cases in which “the same mental state underlies the ascription of two different emotions.” This is a the- sis about the mind–language relationship. The authors also draw the ontological conclusion that, because of the asymmetric mind-language relationship, “there are fewer unique mental states than one might have thought.” There are certain theoretical commitments the au- thors make in formulating their thesis and in presenting the evidence to support it. These assumptions include, first, the conviction that “the emotion lexicon includes the names of mental states”. That is, emotion terms normally refer to mental states and function as their names. This we can call the referential name commit- ment. However, the authors reject the belief that all emotion terms have a one-to-one correspondence with mental states. This is a key distinction, in that they treat M terms as names of mental states but do not think that each M term names exactly one experiential state. Their second important commitment is mental real- ism—the position that mental states actually exist in the mind or organism of the actor and that there are par- ticular mechanisms and conditions that generate these states. Sabini and Silver (this issue) then try to do two things in the target article. They say up front why they believe the mental lexicon might be richer than the mental world, and then they offer a variety of exam- ples, arguments, and empirical data in support of their general thesis. Although, I believe the general thesis fails, the reasons why it fails are interesting in their 21 COMMENTARIES