6 Elite consensus and ineff ectlve strategic narratives The domestic politics behind Canada's commitment to_ Afghanistan 1 Justin Massie Introduction Despite significant domestic opposition, the govemment of Canada chose to sustain a sizable military contribution to the war in Afghanistan. From 2006 to 2011, it maintained an average of over 2,000 combat troops the volatile province of Kandahar - the fourth largest contingent in the U.S.- led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This may strike as odd given that Canada suffered the third highest death toll per after Dcnmark and the UK (Ringsmose and BÇ!)rgesen 2011, 509; Saideman 2012, 8), and extended twice the mandate ofits combat troops in Kanda- har despite a mean public support to the war of merely 40 percent (Kreps 2010, 195). What accounted for the Canadian govemment's decision to maintain its combat presence in Kandahar despite declining public support? After arguing the indeterminacy of system-level detemtinants, this chapter con- tends that key domestic factors played a decisive raie in driving Canada to overcontribute in the Afghan War. More specifically, an Atlanticist stra- tegic culture and the use of strategic narratives respectivelr help sense of Canadian decision-makers' desire and capacity to rmpose their will to a critical public. 1 argue that it is the solidity of the elite consensus on Canada's Atlanticist security policy rather than the effectiveness of the govemment's Slfeitegic narratives that best account for its ability to main- tain a sizable military commitment to the Afghan mission. Strategic cultures and strategic narratives There a;e few systemic and material incentives that may account for Cana- da 's international security policy. Sharing a long, unmilitarized border with the C.S. hegemon, it has rarely (if ever) been overtly coerced to deploy ttoops alongside -lhe U.S. military (Bow 2009) and, because of its unique geographic situation, it bas had the luxury of enjoying the benefits of U.S. provision of'security without incurring much of its costs (Sutherland 1962; Canadas naTTative on Afghanistan 99 Blaxland 2006; Barry and Brau 2008). From a rational choice perspective, there are few material gains that Canada can be expected to secure by shouldering a large share of a collective good already supplied by the United States - in this case, the elimination of al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters. Furthermore, Canada lacks the means to prove instrumental to the achievement of a U.S.-led coalition's political and military object- ives. Had Canada not committed over 2,000 troops in Kandahar from 2006 to 2011, the United States or another NATO ally would have likely com- pensated for Canada's absence. Yet Canadians would have nevertheless benefi.ted from the elimination of the terrorist threat in Afghanistan. One should thus expect Canada to decline taking part in U.S.-led coalitions of the willing or deploy mere token forces and, hence, ride relatively free on the back of the United States. Yet this has not always becn the case. Scholars have therefore tumed their attention to domestic politics in search for an explanation of Canada's recurring tendency - as wimessed during t,he wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya - to commit sizable military contributions to coalitions of the willing or, in the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Lo resist Anglo-American calls for diplomatie and milit.ary suppon. Examining the latter case, Norrin Ripsman (2009, 181-182) argues that "strong public opposition, particularly in .. led dian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to remain on the s1delines, desp1te initial indications that it would send a token Canadian force." This example of "forsaking its primary ally, principal trading panner, and lhe global hegemon, is clear evidence that neorealists pay insufficient atten- tion to the domestic politics" (Labeil, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009, 288). This is becàuse Canada's extemal environment is relatively indeterminate with regards to troop deployment in U.S.-led coalitions. , . . Just as in the case of Iraq, domestic factors seem plausible explananons of Canada's rank as top-tier shareholder rather than free-rider in Afghani- stan (Zyla 2012). lndeed, a system-level analysis of Canada's military com- mitment to Afghanistan recognizes that the international environment acted only as a permissive condition. Unipolarity, in shon, "providcd suc- cessive Canadian govemments with significantly increased freedom of action to independently consider and ultimately pursue foreign policy initiatives, n including the provision of substantial military troops to the war in Afghanistan (Kirkey and Ostroy 2010, 201). But why did Canadian political elites decide to pursue such an initiative in Afghani- stan, but chose not to do so in Iraq? Two sets of domestic-level variables need to be analyzed in order to provide a v.aluable account of Canada's commitment to the Afghanistan mission. The first category of variables relates to decision-making elites' prefer- ences. The nature of these preferences as well as the extent to which they are shared directly impacts a state's desire to commit to coalition hurden- sharing. Indeed, in the absence of coherent and mobilized to the government's decision to deploy troops abroad, state leaders are likely