Uncorrected version; Published in Philosophy & Social Criticism 41(3), 2015, pp. 273-91. DOI.10.1177/0191453714563877 1 The latent cognitive sociology in Habermas: Extrapolated from Between Facts and Norms Piet Strydom School of Sociology and Philosophy University College Cork Ireland Abstract The aim of this article is twofold: to display some of the fruitful starting points in the later Habermas principal monograph for the development of a new kind of cognitive sociology; and to indicate the form of such a sociology by critically extrapolating its major parameters fƌoŵ Haďeƌŵas assumptions regarding immanent transcendence, formal pragmatics and reconstructive sociology. The intended cognitive sociology is conceived as a refinement of a hitherto largely implicit dimension of Critical Theory. Its promise is far-reaching: to sharpen considerably the latteƌs analytical repertoire and penetration; to draw attention to the need to recognize that the foundations of critique are not to be sought directly in normativity but rather in the cognitively structured normative dimension; and to stimulate consideration of the materialist implications of the rootedness of the human cognitive endowment in natural evolution and phylogenesis and the role of the resultant cognitive structures in the construction and elaboration of sociocultural forms of life. Keywords cognitive sociology, critical theory, Habermas, sociology, weak naturalism Between Facts and Norms, particularly Chapter 1 which Jürgen Habermas (1996) devotes to communicative reason or rationality as a substitute for traditional practical reason in the sense of a strategy of mediating the tension between facticity and validity, provides a number of fruitful starting points for a new kind of cognitive sociology. i The extrapolation of such a novel departure from this source requires, however, dealing with and decisively resolving some ambiguities, tensions and lapses iŶ Haďeƌŵas account. The argument is presented in four steps. First, the basic foothold for a cognitive departure in the text is pinpointed by identifying a core statement by Habermas which unmistakably indicates a certain weakening – albeit not admitted – of his adherence to the normative paradigm in favour of allowing a role for the cognitive paradigm. It provides the opportunity to introduce the crucial cognitive sociological concept of the cognitive order of society. With reference to his treatment of the problem of coordination and integration, the second section demonstrates the pervasive presence of the cognitive dimension in the text, yet also its simultaneous marginalization due to a persistent tendency toward the normative over-emphasis of interaction-based mutual understanding and, hence, a failure to incorporate higher-level mechanisms of integration which can accommodate also conflict and dissent. In this case, the parameters of cognitive sociology begin to emerge. Thirdly, the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe foƌ a ĐogŶitiǀe soĐiologiĐal depaƌtuƌe of Haďeƌŵas distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the geŶeƌalitLJ of meaning and the universality of validity is acknowledged, but issue is taken with his conceptualization of the latter strictly in terms of pragmatics to the detriment of the cognitive structure of validity. Here the need for a cognitive complement to his pragmatic approach becomes apparent. Lastly, Haďeƌŵas plaLJiŶg of his oǁŶ ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe soĐiology off against interpretative