China’s Choice: Multilateral-Lite Partnerships and Asian Security Raymond Kuo University at Albany, SUNY Abstract For 20 years, China has pursued regional security engagement through “multilateral-lite” partnerships like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shang- hai Cooperation Organization. Although these bodies lack the institutional restraints found in NATO or other U.S.-aligned alliances, policy makers and constructivist scholars claim that they will socialize China into an “Asian way” of security cooperation: Consensus-based, mutual and amicable resolution of disputes, but with strict regard for state sovereignty. However, since 2010, China has increasingly asserted its political and geo- graphic claims in the Asia-Pacific region. This has led to recurring naval con- frontations in the South China Sea, economic coercion against Japan through the embargo of industrially-critical rare earth metals, and the shielding of North Korea from provocative military and nuclear actions. Yet statesmen continue to tout the importance of multilateral-lite partnerships in stabilizing regional security relations. This article asks: Do these multilateral-lite bodies reduce regional conflict and stabilize security relations? Leveraging quantitative methods and a longer historical framework, I argue that these organizations used to successfully struc- ture interstate military relations and prevent conflict in the past. Now, how- ever, they are ill-equipped to handle the complex challenges facing Asia and the Pacific. States should instead pursue strongly institutionalized alliances, even with sovereignty costs, if they expect to foster a stable and effective regional security regime. 1 1 The author would like to thank Alexander Lanoszka, John Ikenberry, Paul Poast, and advice 1