A problem for moral luck Steven D. Hales Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014 Abstract The present paper poses a new problem for moral luck. Defenders of moral luck uncritically rely on a broader theory of luck known as the control theory or the lack of control theory. However, there are are two other analyses of luck in the literature that dominate discussion in epistemology, namely the probability and modal theories. However, moral luck is nonexistent under the probability and modal accounts, but the control theory cannot explain epistemic luck. While some have posited that ‘‘luck’’ is ambiguous, so that one theory of luck is operative with epi- stemic luck and a different theory works for moral luck, there are both semantic and philosophical reasons to reject luck ambiguity. Defenders of moral luck must engage with the broader literature on luck and either provide a comprehensive defense of the control theory or concede that moral luck is not a genuine thing in its own right. Keywords Luck Á Moral luck Á Moral privilege Á Epistemic luck Á Control Very few writers on moral luck, luck egalitarianism, or moral privilege make any effort to provide a definition or analysis of luck. The few who do assume that the control theory of luck is correct, almost invariably without argument, and rarely even with an acknowledgment of alternative theories. Critics of moral luck proceed solely by offering counterexamples and counterintuitive cases to the principles that are supposed to underwrite moral luck (Cf. Nelkin 2013 for an overview). My argument here is that the problem with moral luck is luck itself. I will argue that moral luck is possible only if one assumes a specific theory of luck, one that is not a suitable account of epistemic luck. What’s more, ‘luck’ is not semantically S. D. Hales (&) Department of Philosophy, Bloomsburg University, 400 East 2nd Street, Bloomsburg, PA 17815, USA e-mail: hales@bloomu.edu 123 Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0417-6