Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 30, Number 3, September 2004 mj^ Carfax Publishing Unveiling South Africa's Nuclear Past VERNE HARRIS,^ SELLO HATANG^ AND PETER LIBERMAN^ ('University of the Witwatersrand; ^South African History Archive; ^Queens College and the Graduate Center, The City University of New York) Research into South African apartheid-era nuclear weapons history has been severely hampered by longstanding secrecy laws, not to mention the destruction of most policy records. The recent declassification and release of a 1975 Defence Force memorandum recommending the acquisition of nuclear weapons, however, shows that important docu- ments have survived. This document sheds new light on military attitudes about nuclear acquisition, and about the extent of the South African-Israeli alliance. It confirms that Israel had offered South Africa missiles, and may have offered nuclear warheads as well. While the release of the 1975 document is promising, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 and the convening of an interdepartmental Classification and Declassification Review Committee in 2002 do not thus far represent a decisive shift toward greater openness on apartheid-era history. The state's incentives for disclosure, controlled to avoid nuclear technology leakage, include the benefits of the lessons of the past to the global non-proliferation regime, contributing to South Africa's prestige and foreign policy agenda, and enhancing the country's democratic transparency. The apartheid-era South African nuclear weapons programnsie, which built and then dismantled six and one-half Hiroshima type bombs, is a rarity in international history. However, more than a decade after the programme's exposure, the historical record of this case remains remarkably thin. A battery of secrecy laws was utilised during the pro- gramme's lifetime to conceal the existence of South Africa's nuclear arsenal. But although the need for concealment evaporated with De Klerk's decision to dismantle the programme, secrecy laws obstructing fuller public disclosure have largely persisted into the democratic era. While there has been no formal, high-level articulation of official nuclear secrecy policy or justifications, officials of two successive African National Congress-led govern- ments have expressed strong objections to further disclosures beyond those made in 1993-1994. The costs of perpetual secrecy are considerable. As one of the few states to acquire a nuclear weapons arsenal and the only state ever to destroy one, the South African case presents an unusual opportunity to study the causes and processes of nuclear acquisition and disarmament. South Africa's nuclear history is thus a potentially valuable source of lessons for global non-proliferation policy. The case also bears important lessons in nuclear safety and control procedures, which could help other small nuclear powers, such as India and Pakistan, to secure their own arsenals. The value of the South African experience became more widely recognised when, in February 2003, Pretoria dispatched a team of diplomats and former weapons officials to advise Iraq on verifiable disarmament. The South African government appears to be ambivalent and internally divided about greater openness on apartheid-era history, but there are signs of movement. The new South African constitution, which enshrines access to information as a fundamental right, the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) of 2000, and the establishment in 2002 of ISSN 0305-7070 print; 1465-3893 online/04/030457-20 © 2004 Journal of Southern African Studies DOI: 10.1080/0305707042000254074