Development and Natural Kinds Some Lessons from Biology * Marco J. Nathan and Andrea Borghini Synthese, 191, pp. 539-56, 2014 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0290-4 The final publication is available at link.springer.com Abstract While philosophers tend to consider a single type of causal history, biologists distin- guish between two kinds of causal history: evolutionary history and developmental history. This essay studies the peculiarity of development as a criterion for the in- dividuation of biological traits and its relation to form, function, and evolution. By focusing on examples involving serial homologies and genetic reprogramming, we argue that morphology (form) and function, even when supplemented with evolutionary his- tory, are sometimes insufficient to individuate traits. Developmental mechanisms bring in a novel aspect to the business of classification—identity of process type —according to which entities are type-identical across individuals and natural kinds in virtue of the fact that they form and develop through similar processes. These considerations bear important metaphysical implications and have potential applications in several areas of philosophy. * We would like to express our gratitude to Claudio Calosi, Elena Casetta, Giuseppe Feola, Laura Franklin-Hall, Daniele Fulvi, Giorgio Lando, Patrizia Pedrini, Matthew Slater, Neil Williams, and, especially, to Achille Varzi and Sebastian Watzl, for constructive comments on various versions of this essay. Earlier drafts were delivered at the Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA) in Padua, at the International Congress of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science (SILFS) in Bergamo, at the Conference for Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science hosted by the University of Toronto, and at the Department of Philosophy at the College of the Holy Cross. The audiences at all these venues provided excellent feedback. We are also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. In developing some of the ideas discussed in this article, M. J. Nathan benefited from a visiting position at the Laboratory for Stem Cell Biology and Pharmacology of Neurodegenerative Diseases at the University of Milan: many thanks to Elena Cattaneo and her research team for their support. Department of Philosophy, University of Denver. Email: marco.nathan@du.edu Department of Philosophy, College of the Holy Cross. E-mail: aborghin@holycross.edu 1