BOCHUMER PH I LOSOPH ISCH ES JAHRBUCH FUR ANTI KE UND MITTELALTER Herausgegeb en von Burkhard Mojsisch, Olaf Pluta und Rudolf Rehn Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Werner Beierwaltes, Munchen Linos Benakis, Athen Egbert P. Bos, Leiden Stephen F. Brown, Boston College Stefano Caroti, Parma Francesco Del Punta, Pisa Sten Ebbesen, Kopenhagen Gerhard Endree, Bochum Michael Erler, WUrzburg Graziella Vescovini Federici, Florenz Gianfranco Fioravanti, Pisa Kurt Flasch, Mainz Hellmut Flashar, Munchen Gian Carlo Garfagnini, Florenz Andreas Graeser, Bern Dimitri Gutas, Yale University Vilem Herold, Prag Ruedi Imbach, Freiburg i. U. Zenon Kaluza, Paris Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, Warschau Alain de Libera, Paris Alfonso Maierit, Rom John Marenbon, Cambridge Mieczyslaw Markowski, Krakau Julius M. Moravcsik, Stanford University Yoshiki Nakayama, Kyoto John Sallis, Pennsylvania State University Steven K. Strange, Emory University Sarah Stroumsa, Jerusalem Loris Sturlese, Lecce Cesare Vasoli, Florenz Wolfgang Wieland, Heidelberg Paola Zambelli, Florenz Redaktion Klaus Kahnert, Arne Malmsheimer, Franz-Bernhard Stammkotter und Orrin F. Summerell Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch ftir Antike und Mittelalter 4 (1999) © 1999 John Benjamins B.V., Amsterdam RIP GRGI Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge The Meno begins with Meno's abrupt question whether virtue is teach- able.' Socrates replies that he does not know what virtue is and that since it is impossible to know what something is like without knowing what it is, he is not able to say whether virtue is teachable.' Therefore, he pro- poses to inquire with Meno into what virtue is. Meno offers three an- swers, and Socrates rebuts each of them in a manner common in Plato's earlier dialogues.' Then Meno replies, apparently with some anger and sarcasm, 4 stating what is usually called <Meno's paradox> (hereafter MP): «In what way are you going to inquire into this, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? What sort of a thing, among the things you do not know, will you take this to be, when you set it before yourself as the object of inquiry? And even if you happen upon it, how will you know that this is the thing you did not know?» 5 Socrates reformulates Meno's questions in the form of the <eristic argu- ment> (hereafter EA): «I understand what you wish to say, Meno. Do you see that what you are bringing up is the eristic argument, that it is not possible for a man to inquire into either what he knows or what he does not know? For he could not inquire into what he knows — for See Plato, Meno 70a1-3 (all translations F. G., following Bluck's pagination; see R. S. Bluck, Plato's Meno [Cambridge 1961]). 2 See Plato, Meno 71a3-b7. ' See Plato, Meno 71e1-79e3. On Meno's sarcasm at 80d5-8 see E. S. Thompson, The Meno of Plato (London 1901), p. 117; Bluck, Plato's Meno, p. 272; J. Moline, «Meno's ParadoxN, in: Phronesis 14 (1969), p. 157. 5 Plato, Meno 80d5-8.