Language and Knowledge in Plato’s Cratylus Viktor Ilievski UDC: 130.2:8] :141.131 141.131:800.1 Abstract The argument of Plato’s Cratylus is conducted along the lines of examination of two con- licting theories of correctness of names, namely conventionalism and naturalism; in the course of the dialogue Socrates demonstrates that none of the theories provides truly ac- curate account of the names-objects relation. His own standpoint is that language is unre- liable and that things should be investigated and learned about through themselves, rather than through their images, the names. This conclusion pushes the phonetic and semantic investigations aside, and establishes the supremacy of eidetic epistemology over its onomatic counterpart. The main objectives of this paper will be: a) to follow the interplay of Socrates’ arguments by which he challenges both theories of correctness of names, and b) to brief- ly investigate the implications and the impact of the eidetic epistemology thesis on Plato’s general attitude toward language. In order to accomplish the second objective, I shall turn to the Seventh Letter and point out some afinity between its philosophic digression and the conclusions of the Cratylus. Thus it will be shown that Plato’s attitude toward language was not very favorable, and that his method of dialectic was devised in such a way as to ultimately avoid and overcome the pitfalls of language. Keywords: Plato, language, The Cratylus, Seventh Letter, naturalism, conventionalism, dialectic I Cratylus is Plato’s only dialogue where language-related subjects are quite extensively discussed. The issue in the forefront of this work is the question of “correctness of names” 1 (orthotes tōn onomatōn), as it is shown by its opening statement (383a3-4). 2 But 1 By names, Plato in Cratylus implies “a loose linguistic category, understood as including common nouns and adjectives as well as proper names.” (Sedley, Plato’s Cratylus 4). More precisely, “‘onoma’ is used in the Cratylus to refer to nonsyncategorematic words, words which can be said to be true of something.” (Ketchum 133) 2 This view is endorsed both by Sedley (2003) and Barney (2001). But it hasn’t always been the case. A.E. Taylor, for example, used to hold that the ostensive subject of the dialogue was the origin of language, while its main concern was to consider the function and use of language (see Taylor, Plato 77f). TOPIC OF THE ISSUE