The Aesthetics of Morality: Schiller’s Critique of Kantian Rationalism Anne Margaret Baxley* Washington University in St. Louis Abstract Philosophers often mention Friedrich Schiller as the author of a famous epigram taking aim at Kant’s account of moral motivation: Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. To this, the answer is given: Surely, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, And then with aversion do what your duty enjoins. These joking lines capture a natural objection to Kant’s rationalist picture of moral motivation, especially as it appears in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Schiller himself, however, intended his poem as a caricature of Kant’s view, reserving his considered critique of Kant’s practical philosophy for his extended treatise ‘On Grace and Dignity’. It is in this major work that Schiller begins his debate with Kant about the aesthetic aspect of morality, sets out a systematic account of his own ethics, and argues for an account of character according to which the virtuous person is inclined to do her duty and takes pleasure in moral action. This essay aims to highlight the importance of Schiller’s ‘On Grace and Dignity’, which is a valuable resource in relation to contemporary debates about Kant’s moral psychology. Section 1 outlines the main features of Schiller’s concerns with Kantian rationalism. Section 2 surveys a number of recent critical discus- sions of Schiller’s interpretation of Kant. Finally, Section 3 concludes with some observations about the historical and broader philosophical significance of ‘On Grace and Dignity’. Among philosophers, Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) is often cited as the author of a famous epigram taking aim at Kant’s account of moral motivation. As readers familiar with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals will recall, in that work, Kant insists that the person with a good will acts in accordance with duty from the motive of duty, not from natural emotion or inclination (Gr 4: 394–7; 50–2). On this Kantian view, there is no special moral worth involved in helping others from a sense of natural sympathy, for genuine moral worth is displayed only when one helps others from a sense of duty alone, even if one lacks sympathy for those in need or is altogether indifferent to their suffering (Gr 4: 397–9; 52–4). One key objection often leveled at such an account of moral motivation is that Kant seems to think that it is better to do one’s duty in the absence of feelings and inclinations in favor of duty, or even in the face of contrary feelings and inclinations that provided opposi- tion to duty, than to do one’s duty with pleasure and ease. Schiller first captured this very worry about Kant’s rationalist moral psychology in his well-known distich: Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. To this the answer is given: Philosophy Compass 5/1 (2010): 1–12, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00350.x ª 2010 The Authors Philosophy Compass ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd