In: Gregor Betz, Dirk Koppelberg, David Löwenstein, and Anna Wehofsits (eds.): Weiter denken – über Philosophie, Wissenschaft und Religion. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015, pp. 205-210 A Note on the Concept of Game (or rather Spiel) Paul Hoyningen-Huene Institute of Philosophy, Leibniz Universität Hannover Abstract. It is well-known that Wittgenstein argued that games have no properties in common that could be used to construct an explicit definition of “game” in terms of necessary and sufficient condi- tions for its application. In fact, Wittgenstein’s arguments concern the notion of Spiel and not the no- tion of game. In this note, I want to argue against Wittgenstein’s thesis mainly by presenting an explic- it definition of Spiel. In modern philosophy, the concept of game is one of the most frequently discussed non- philosophical concepts. Its fame derives from Wittgenstein’s analysis in his Philosophical Investigations, §§ 65-71 (Wittgenstein (1958 [1953]). The concept of game is Wittgenstein’s anchor point for introducing his concept of family resemblance. Wittgenstein’s thesis is that games have no properties in common that could be used to construct an explicit definition of “game” in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. In this note, I want to argue against this thesis, henceforth called “Wittgenstein’s thesis”. 1. In discussing Wittgenstein’s thesis, it should be noted that, in the German original, the corresponding word is “Spiel”. Unfortunately, there is no precise equivalent to “Spiel” in English. This has, of course, been noted in the literature (see, e.g., Baker and Hacker (1984 [1980]-a), p. 132). The common English translation of “Spiel” is “game”. However, this is not a literal translation. The concept Spiel has a wider extension than the concept game, as it also includes things that are subsumed under the concept of play. For instance, the famous Bay- reuth opera festival is called “Bayreuther Festspiele” in German, whereas the concept of game does not apply to such events. In the German original, Wittgenstein’s thesis is that no explicit definition exists for the concept of Spiel, whose extension can probably best be ren- dered in English as “all that is played”. This linguistic difference between game and Spiel is not entirely inconsequential, contrary to what Baker and Hacker claim (ibid.). For, even if one could find an accurate definition of “game” (a definition that would not completely cover the