The Encyclopedia of the Roman Army, First Edition. Edited by Yann Le Bohec. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118318140.wbra1384 1 Siege Warfare: Late Empire PHILIP RANCE Sieges constitute more than half the military engagements in Late Antiquity (Petersen 2013; Elton, WRE: 257–263; Southern & Dixon: 148– 167). Our knowledge of late Roman siege warfare is nevertheless partial and suffers from chronological and geographical imbalances. These partly reflect actual operational patterns varying according to region, opponent, and period, but also the uneven coverage of the source materials, and in particular the exceptional value of the military narratives of Ammianus Marcellinus (for 353–378 CE) and Procopius (527–552 CE) compared, for example, to the fragmentary sources for the 5th century. Furthermore, the fundamentally defensive strategy pursued by the late Roman Empire up to the 6th century more often placed Roman troops in the role of besieged than besieger. Detailed accounts of Roman siegecraft in the 4th and 5th centuries CE are therefore few in number, especially in the west, and generally relate either to civil wars, such as the sieges of Aquileia in 361 or Cyzicus in 363 (Amm. Marc. 21.11–12; 26.8.7–11), or rare offen- sives against Persia, notably Julian’s invasion in 363, although similarities in techniques reported in both regions imply a degree of procedural standardiza- tion. The long peace with Persia during most of the 5th century left the Romans initially ill prepared for and inexperienced in sieges, especially at a logistical level, when war broke out in 502 (Ps.-Zach. 7.6). Thereafter, recurrent Romano-Persian conflict throughout the 6th and early 7th centuries, and the protracted wars of conquest launched by Justinian (527–565 CE) in North Africa, Italy, Spain, and the southern Caucasus, greatly increased the range and frequency of Roman offensive siege operations. Historical and Geographical Contexts Siege warfare on the eastern frontier was alto- gether more developed. Of the Romans’ enemies only the Persians, partly by inheriting long-standing poliorcetic traditions of Mesopotamia, partly through imitating Roman techniques (Leriche 1993), regularly possessed the technological and logistical expertise required to mount lengthy siege operations, such as their three-month sieges of Nisibis in 350 CE and Amida in 502–503 CE, and six-month siege of Dara in 573 CE. The Romans knew the Persians also to be skilled in fortifications and exceptionally obstinate in defense, owing to a combination of martial ethos, patriotism, and exemplary punishments for fail- ure. Accordingly, the prospect of besieging a Persian garrison was avoided wherever possible (Procop. Wars 8.12.28–29). In contrast, it is a commonplace of Roman literature that European barbarians constructed no substantial fortifica- tions and were inept at siege warfare, a sentiment encapsulated in the Gothic ruler Fritigern’s asser- tion (c.378) that he was “at peace with walls” (Amm. Marc. 31.6.4). Germanic invaders of the 4th and 5th centuries were ordinarily incapable of organizing successful long-term investments of Roman fortifications without themselves incur- ring logistical difficulties (Malchus fr. 2). This led them to seek easier targets, although they were capable of taking fortifications by covert means such as surprise assaults, treachery, or deception (Elton, WRE: 82–86). At a later date, the deliberate destruction of fortifications in Germanic succes- sor kingdoms in the west when threatened by east Roman offensives, notably by the Vandals in North Africa and the Ostrogoths in Italy, point to their lack of skill and confidence in siegecraft. Generally speaking, “steppe” barbarians achieved greater success. The Huns obtained occasional access to Roman technology, presumably through captives or deserters, as during their sieges of Naissus in 442 and Aquileia in 452 CE (Priscus fr. 6.2; 22.1; Tausend 1985/1986). The political authority imposed by Attila upon a federation of peoples in the Danube basin (c.435–450 CE) also provided vast numbers of subjects who could be hurled into hazardous assaults. Similar factors underlie Avar successes at the height of their hegemony in the 580s–620s, when they typically relied on the expendable manpower of their Slavic subjects, although they also pioneered the