Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable? Cory D. Wright Published online: 15 January 2011 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Abstract Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable— or, worse, just a non-starter—it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing argu- ments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all. Keywords Truth Á Pluralism Á Property Á Instability Á Scope problem Á Reductive analysis Á Uniformity assumption Á Disjunctivism 1 A precarious position? In thinking and talking about truth, we intuitively take ourselves to be thinking and talking about one-and-the-same thing (Næss 1938). This intuition grounds the uniformity assumption (UA), according to which the nature or essence of truth never varies, regardless of discursive commitments, entitlements, or content. Subject matter doesn’t matter. (UA) If truth has a nature, then it has a uniform nature that is invariant across discipline or region of discourse. Because of its grounding in intuition, (UA) has rarely been examined, and when it has theorists seem to have found it to be unworthy of that very C. D. Wright (&) Department of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach, McIntosh Humanities Building (917), 1250 Bellflower Boulevard, Long Beach, CA 90840-2408, USA e-mail: cdwright@csulb.edu 123 Philos Stud (2012) 159:89–105 DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9691-0