1 Placing Respect in the Foreground Plato on Different Kinds of Recognition Elena Irrera (University of Bologna) Abstract (150 words): This paper explores the notion of respect and outlines four ways of understanding it. As Stephen Darwall has argued, we might think of respect as (i) a form of esteem for the outstanding moral qualities of specific agents; (ii) an “asymmetric” reverence for individuals holding peculiar positions of power; (iii) a recognition of th e technical expertise of a certain individual (iv) a recognition of the inherent moral authority of an individual qua human being. I apply Darwall’s analysis to a study of Plato and propose that at least three types of respect appear across his dialogues. I also suggest that the way in which different kinds of respect dynamically interact in Plato’s works might open up new paths of investigation for the possibility of framing models which do not emerge from Darwall’s analysis: an emulative appraisal respect, a moral epistemic authority and a form of honor as “cultivation” of virtue. Key words: Darwall, Plato, Respect, Appraisal, Honor Introduction In recent years, the idea of respect for persons has generated a considerable amount of attention among political philosophers, being generally envisaged not only as a general guide to ethical practice, but also as one of the most forceful normative principles to which liberal democratic institutions are committed in their attempt to negotiate different types of tensions inherent in political life. Respect can be defined as a complex relationship subsisting between (1) two persons (the respecter and the respected), (2) some characteristic (the basis of respect), and (3) and some evaluative point of view (from which the characteristic possessed by the respected subject is regarded as a good thing to possess) 1 . As Stephen Darwall has argued 2 , respect is a value that admits of a plurality of expressions. On his view, we might think of respect at least in four different ways: (i) as a form of esteem for the outstanding moral qualities of specific agents (appraisal respect); (ii) as a kind of “asymmetric” reverence for individuals holding peculiar positions of power (e.g. reverence for a ruler, or an institutional figure) (respect as honor); (iii) as a recognition of the technical expertise of a given individual and a consequential tendency to follow the indications prescribed by the expert person (respect as epistemic authority); (iv) a “symmetric” 1 See C. Cranor, “Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons”, American Philosophical Quarterly 12(1975), pp. 303-319. 2 See S.L. Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect”, Ethics 88(1977), pp. 36-49. Cf. “Due tipi di rispetto come riconoscimento per le persone”, In I. Carter, A.E. Galeotti, V. Ottonelli (eds.), Eguale Rispetto, Milano, Mondadori, 2008, pp. 1-23.