Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 61, Number 2, 2015, pp.217-232. © 2015 The Authors. Australian Journal of Politics and History © 2015 School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd. The Prime Minister and the Bomb: John Gorton, W.C. Wentworth and the Quest for an Atomic Australia LACHLAN CLOHESY AND PHILLIP DEERY Victoria University, Melbourne The efforts of the Liberal government led by John Gorton to acquire a locally built nuclear deterrent stretch back into the 1950s when Robert Menzies preferred to rely on the American or British nuclear umbrella for protection. Gorton took a different view and the advocates of an independent Australian nuclear capability rejoiced upon his elevation to the Liberal leadership. We argue that Gorton’s ambitions advanced as far as they did in the latter 1960s due to the support, or urgings, from an informal coalition of scientists (particularly Philip Baxter) and discontented fringes of the parliamentary Liberal Party. In particular, the maverick backbencher, W.C. Wentworth, played a key role in mobilising support for Gorton’s controversial quest to acquire an independent nuclear capacity. When John Gorton became Prime Minister on 10 January 1968, the advocates of an independent Australian nuclear capability rejoiced. Gorton had both contributed to and was influenced by the Liberal Party’s “bomb lobby”. From 1968, his government embarked on a nuclear policy that represented a decisive shift from the past, one that ultimately approved Australia’s first nuclear power station at Jervis Bay — the precondition for a home-grown nuclear weapon. This was contrary to the position of the United States (US), which supported international negotiations for a nuclear non- proliferation treaty against the backdrop of successful atomic testing in the 1960s by both France and China. The historiography of the Australian quest to acquire nuclear technology in the post- war period is extensive. In particular, Wayne Reynolds’ path-breaking research has established beyond dispute how that quest was pursued vigorously by both mainstream political parties. 1 However, Reynolds’ studies do not extend to the Gorton years and, when discussed by other scholars, Gorton’s contribution is seen only in the context of a longer tradition by previous Australian governments to achieve a nuclear capability. 2 1 See Wayne Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Melbourne, 2000); idem, “Atomic War, Empire Strategic Dispersal and the Origins of the Snowy Mountains Scheme”, War and Society, Vol. 14, 1 (May 1996), pp.121-44; idem, “Menzies and the Proposal for Atomic Weapons” in Frank Cain, ed., Menzies in War and Peace (Sydney, 1997), pp.116-37; idem, “Rethinking the Joint Project: Australia’s Bid for Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1960”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 41, 3 (1998), pp.853- 73; idem, “Atomic Weapons and the Problem of Australian Security, 1946-1957”, War and Society, Vol. 17, 1 (May 1999), pp.57-79; idem, “The Wars That Were Planned: Australia’s Forward Defence Posture in Asia and the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1967”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, 3 (November 1999), pp.295-310. 2 See, for example, Alice Cawte, Atomic Australia: 1944-1990 (Sydney, 1992) and, from a non- proliferation perspective, Jim Walsh, “Surprise Down Under: The secret history of Australia’s nuclear