Religious Conversion, Self-Deception, and Pascal’s Wager Ward E. Jones [Published in Journal of the History of Philosophy 36:2, pp. 167-188 (April 1998). Please use published version for citation.] Blaise Pascal’s Pensées is a sustained attempt to convert, to lead its reader to form the belief in the articles of faith. Pascal does not hope to convert by a direct presentation of evidence or argument, but rather attempts to induce in the reader a desire for belief in the articles of faith. He hopes that this desire will lead the reader to put herself in a situation in which she will form the belief. Pascal, in other words, wants the reader to take control over her belief in the articles of faith, to form it because she wants to do so. We commonly put ourselves in a situation for the purpose of forming beliefs. This is what happens when we choose to go, say, to university; choosing to learn is choosing to form beliefs in a given field. Pascal urges something more paradoxical. 1 He wants to induce us to form a particular belief (or set of beliefs). His dual aim is (i) to induce the unbeliever to want a belief, and then (ii) to induce her to do what she can to gain that belief. Now if I want a particular belief, I might place myself in a situation in which nonrational or pragmatic determinants would bring about the belief. I might, that is, visit a hypnotist or a brainwasher. I might choose some process which will either directly bring about the desired belief without involving my epistemic capabilities, or which will diminish my epistemic capabilities. Alternatively, I might search for evidence for the desired belief. Wanting to believe that the earth is flat, for example, I might join the Flat Earth Society, hoping to discover or be convinced by the evidence that there is for such a belief. If successful, either process would end in our adoption of a belief. There are,