Critique and Naturalism: Friedrich Schlegel and the Principles of the Enlightenment Asko Nivala Romanticism was an intellectual and literary movement that originated in the 1790s. It is commonly defined in contrast with the preceding epoch of the En- lightenment. According to a disputed but influential stereotype, Romanticism re- jected the rationalism of the Enlightenment. 1 In the twentieth century, Isaiah Ber- lin in particular was a prominent advocate of this position, arguing that Romanti- cism was an irrational movement abandoning universality and objectivity, which were the essential principles of the Enlightenment. 2 Recent scholarship has criticised Berlin’s simplistic reading of Romanticism. Robert E. Norton has pointed out that Berlin’s concept of Counter-Enlighten- ment rests on an insufficient acquaintance with primary sources. 3 Furthermore, according to Vesa Oittinen, Berlin tends to read the self-critical aspects of the En- lightenment as irrationalism. 4 In order to provide a more flexible reading of the Romanticism, it is essential to note that the problem of Berlin’s argument lies not only in his scematic conception of Romanticism, but also in his too simplistically monolithic notion of the Enlightenment. That is, Berlin’s interpretation not only reduces the Romantic critique of reason to irrationalism but also neglects the in- ternal diversity of the German Enlightenment movement by stigmatising some of its nominalistic forms as antirational Counter-Enlightenment. 5 Hence, if the En- lightenment is crucial context for understanding Romanticism, then our concep- 1 See Ludwig Stockinger, ‘Die Auseinandersetzung der Romantiker mit der Aufklärung’, Romantik-Handbuch, ed. Helmut Schanze (Stuttgart, 2003), p. 82–86; Gerhart Hoffmeister, ‘Forschungsgeschichte’, Romantik-Handbuch, ed. Helmut Schanze (Stuttgart, 2003), p. 178– 207, and Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanti- cism (Cambridge & London, 2006), p. 45, 203. 2 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism (Princeton, 2001), passim. 3 Robert E. Norton, ‘The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment’, Journal of the History of Ideas 4 (October 2007), vol. 68, p. 635–658. 4 Vesa Oittinen, ‘Herder, ekspressiivisyyden filosofi’, Herder, Suomi, Eurooppa, eds Sakari Olli- tervo & Kari Immonen (Helsinki, 2006), p. 29–30. For an English summary, see p. 537. 5 Herder’s early historicism was based partly on Hamannian nominalism and its claim that there is no universal reason outside history. See, for instance, Johann Gottfried Herder, Werke, Bd I (München & Wien, 1984), p. 611, 614; Ulrich Karthaus, Sturm und Drang: Epoche – Werke – Wirkung (München, 2007), p. 34. The criticism of the universalistic ten- dencies of the Enlightenment, however, does not imply any kind of irrationalism.