The political economy of government size George Tridimas a, * , Stanley L. Winer b a School of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim BT37 0QB, UK b School of Public Policy and Administration and Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada K1S5B6 Received 19 November 2003; received in revised form 26 July 2004; accepted 18 November 2004 Available online 18 January 2005 Abstract We contribute to the political economy of public-sector growth by integrating three essential elements (i) the ddemandT for government stemming from attempts to coercively redistribute, as well as from demand for public services, often analyzed in a median voter framework; (ii) the dsupplyT of taxable activities emphasized in Leviathan and other models of taxation; and (iii) the distribution of dpolitical influenceT when influence and economic welfare are distinct. We combine these elements in a spatial voting framework, and use the comparative static properties of the model to shed light on empirical results in the literature. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D70; H0; H3 Keywords: Size of government; Coercive redistribution; Political influence; Probabilistic spatial voting 1. Introduction A systematic account of the size of government in democratic countries includes at least three elements. First, ddemandT for government stems from attempts to use the fiscal system to coercively redistribute, as well as from the usual demand for public services. Second, it is necessary to investigate the role of the dsupplyT of activities on which taxation may be levied. 0176-2680/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.11.003 * Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 28 90 368273; fax: +44 28 90 366847. E-mail address: GTridimas@aol.com (G. Tridimas). European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 21 (2005) 643–666 www.elsevier.com/locate/ejpe