Curry’s Paradox and the Inclosure Schema MARTIN PLEITZ 1 Abstract: To show that the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes have the same structure, Graham Priest has formulated his Inclosure Schema and shown that it characterizes the paradoxes of both groups. I will argue that the failure of the Inclosure Schema to also characterize Curry’s paradox is more important than is usually realized. I will show how this failure can be addressed in a way that harmonizes with Priest’s own use of the Inclo- sure Schema. In order to achieve this I will formulate what I call the Curry Schema, show that it describes curry-like paradoxes in a way similar to how the Inclosure Schema describes those logical paradoxes that establish a con- tradiction, and formulate a more general schema, which characterizes both inclosure paradoxes and curry-like paradoxes. I will end, however, on a more critical note by pointing out why the resulting more general diagnosis of the logical paradoxes (now including Curry’s paradox) might turn out to be ambivalent with regard to Priest’s project. Keywords: Curry’s paradox, logical paradoxes, paradoxes of self- reference, semantic and set theoretic paradoxes, Inclosure Schema, Princi- ple of Uniform Solution, Graham Priest, dialetheism, paraconsistency, logi- cal revision, metaphysical revision, vicious circle principle 1 The logical paradoxes In this paper, I will restrict my attention to paradoxology – it will mainly be about the comparison of paradoxes and the question of how to sort para- doxes into categories, with only bits of diagnosis and hints at possible solu- tions thrown in. The paradoxes that are of interest include the paradoxes of Cantor, Burali- Forti, Mirimanoff, Russell, Berry, König, Richard, Grelling, the Liar para- dox, and the more recent addition of Yablo’s paradox. Graham Priest calls 1 I would like to thank Graham Priest, Niko Strobach, Heinrich Wansing, and all other par- ticipants of the logic colloquium on March 25 th , 2014 in Münster for a helpful discussion. 1