99 Faris: Egypt and amErican policy Deep State, Deep CriSiS: egypt anD ameriCan poliCy David M. Faris Mr. Faris is an assistant professor of political science at Roosevelt University. © 2013, The Author Middle East Policy © 2013, Middle East Policy Council E gypt’s travails since the January 25, 2011, uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak from power have the outlook of even the most ardent optimists. After three tumultuous years, Egypt is arguably less democratic, less peaceful and even more fractious than it was before 2011. Egypt’s elites failed to agree upon a workable set of institutional arrangements for a complex and dificult democratic transition, or to reform the country’s sprawling security apparatus. They also turned viciously on one another in a prolonged street confrontation that began on June 30 and led to the military coup against President Mohammad Morsi, eroding all trust among Egypt’s political factions. Unfortunately, Egypt’s problems are much deeper than mere political po- larization and the refusal of political elites to follow the rules of democratic politics. The July 2013 putsch that deposed Presi- dent Morsi with the enthusiastic backing of the political opposition, the military and formerly disgraced elements of the Mubarak-era state highlighted Egypt’s most vexing long-term problem: the deter- mination of a set of predatory, extractive elites — the so-called “deep state” — to sabotage movement toward more inclusive economic or political policies. These elites have proven over a long period of time that they are incapable of bringing prosperity to the country or resolving sectarian ten- sions. And they are unwilling to participate in a reform process that would ultimately impinge on their interests. How should U.S. policy makers approach this volatile situation? Unfor- tunately there are no easy answers. For too long, U.S. discourse about Egypt in particular, and the Middle East in general, has revolved around a false dichotomy be- tween supporting soft authoritarianism or allowing political Islam to establish control over key regional states. As the approval of Morsi’s ouster from many quarters of American political discourse proved, 1 far from moving us past this debate, the events of the Arab Spring have only intensiied it by giving what was once a theoreti- cal debate the fraught tension of actual politics. Yet it remains the wrong debate. It reinforces a tendency to believe that the United States has more inluence in Egypt and on Egyptian politics than it actually does, and it obscures the very real policy changes amenable to some U.S. inluence that might lead Egypt in a more sustainable political direction. Ultimately, while the