MAI Review, 2009, 3, Peer Commentary 3 Māori culture: contemporary or not? Brendan Hokowhitu Abstract: Williams and Henare’s article (2009) offers a bicultural structuralism specific to the New Zealand situation. The present commentary unpacks such an idea by examining structuralism, poststructuralism and Enlightenment rationalism. Keywords: Enlightenment rationalism; poststructuralism; structuralism The present article is timely in the wake of the recent death (30 October 2009) of the famous cultural anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose work borrowed from the ideas of structural linguists in helping to synthesise the structuralist school of thought and, in particular, structural anthropology. One of Lévi-Strauss’ key considerations centred around the taboo myth, which he held was common to the majority of cultures regarding incest. That is, he argued that most cultures, for genetically good reason, had an inclination to ban incest and thus created cultural mythologies or ‘taboos’ surrounding such practices. Thus, structuralism can be loosely defined as the search for underlying structures or patterns of thought, which universally underpin human activity. Williams and Henare’s article finds some middle ground between a structuralist position and what could be called a poststructural philosophy, at once calling the reader to recognise that “we are unified as human beings at the broadest level” whilst also positing the “diversity of ‘existences’”. I employ the term ‘poststructural’ here to invoke the idea that multiple truths co-exist and are dependent upon a multitude of epistemological viewpoints, as the Williams and Henare article in-part presumes. Such a positioning is in stark opposition to the universalising principles of Enlightened rationalism from whence ‘modern’ science derived. In the universe of Enlightened rationalism, it was assumed that reason (that is, European reason) could differentiate between truth and falsehood and, thus, the world was inherently knowable. That is, that the universe could be uni-dimensionally explained. Hence, statistics developed to propagate ideas such as objectivity, generalisability, validity (coherence) and reliability, and conterminously, universal truth. Through the ‘cultural revolution’ Indigenous epistemologies amongst other variant perspectives challenged and, as Williams and Henare’s article points out, continue to challenge the uni-dimensional imposition of Enlightenment rationalism. More to the point, poststructuralism developed to suggest that the ‘single truth’ inherent to modernity and its mouthpiece, positivist science, were merely a will to power serving to propagate and preserve the privilege of a few. It should be pointed out that, at times, Williams and Henare similarly invoke a narrow definition of ‘science’ (and theory) privileging explanation (making the world knowable), prediction, control, objectivity and the elimination of confounding variables. Here, I pose the question for discussion: can self (subjectivity) ever be eliminated from our research? Whether hidden behind the thin veneer of positivistic objectivity or not, I believe there is no approach to research that is non-ideological. Page 1 of 3 http://review.mai.ac.nz