Pli 9 (2000), 156-73. Sokal & Bricmont: Back to the Frying Pan * DAVID MILLER If you can distinguish truth from knowledge, you should be able to distinguish the radical disavowal of truth [which usually takes the form of relativism, or sometimes nihilism] from the radical disavowal of knowledge [scepticism]. The former doctrine is false, but uninterestingly so. The latter doctrine is true. By persistently presenting them as a single doctrine, would-be spokesmen for rationalism are driven to defend the indefensible, and unwittingly to offer the best possible incitement to irrationalism. 0 Introduction Without necessarily agreeing with all that they say, rationalists can be expected to look with favour on the denunciation by Sokal [1996] and Sokal & Bricmont [1998] of the intellectually insulting infantilism afflicting parts of current continental philosophy (or European philosophy, as it now describes itself). But it would be rash to hope for a prompt return, amongst those adversely influenced by Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Baudrillard, Deleuze & Guattari, and the rest of them, to the much maligned Enlightenment ideals of truth, reason, and intellectual responsibility. Lofty profundity is such a useful material from which to build reputations, careers, and graduate schools. A more fundamental obstacle to a general return to rationalism is that rationalism itself is * This article has benefited from the critical attention of Joseph Agassi, Adam Chmielewski, Kenneth Hopf, Deryck Horton, Greg Hunt, Jeffrey Ketland, Ian Jarvie, Jan Lester, David McDonagh, Malcolm McElhone, Peeter Müürsepp, and Marlene Sim. Andrew Barker gave me advice about Pyrrho. Hopf suggested the title, for which I am most grateful. Responsibility for errors is reserved.