mechanism of LTP is useful and helps the reader to avoid getting lost in the details of contemporary neuroscientific research. Indeed, most arguments can be understood without any significant background in neuroscience. At the same time, it would have been interesting to see Craver’s impressive conceptual apparatus at work on other (less mature) research programs, especially in cognitive neuroscience, in which attempts to bridge the gap from ‘how-possibly’ to ‘how-actually’ mechanisms are often tentative. That being said, Explaining the Brain still does a great job in reconstructing the features of good explanations in neuroscience. Craver is especially innovative and convincing on matters of causal relevance and interlevel integrations, which are central to neuroscience, but also to biological and social sciences. The book is thus not only relevant and challenging for those interested in explaining the brain, but more generally for those trying to explain complex phenomena in terms of constitutive mechanisms. Benoı ˆt Dubreuil Department of Philosophy Universite ´ du Que ´bec a ` Montre ´al Canada Dubreuil.benoit@uqam.ca REFERENCES Kim, J. (1998), Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Woodward, J. (2003), Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press. Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition, by Frederick Neuhouser. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 296 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-954267-3 hb £35.00 While Jean-Jacques Rousseau has received consistent attention in departments of literature and political science, contributions by Dieter Henrich (1992), Richard Velkley (1989, 2002), Susan Neiman (1997), Joshua Cohen (1997), Terence Irwin (2008), and Frederick Neuhouser (2000) suggest that interest in Rousseau’s influence on the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German philosophy, and interest in Rousseau more generally, may be gaining ground in departments of philosophy. 1 Indeed, Neuhouser’s latest book, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition, will be of interest to those working across the disciplines of philosophy, political science, and literature; but it will be of particular value to scholars and advanced students concerned with the social, psychological, moral, and political implications of Rousseau’s account of amour-propre, that specific form of self-love that Rousseau’s readers have all too often identified as ‘a wholly negative phenomenon’ (p. 15), and hence ‘the principle source of an array of evils so widespread that they can easily appear to be necessary features of the human condition: enslavement (or domination), conflict, vice, misery, and self-estrangement’ (pp. 2, 70–89). To his credit, Neuhouser does not assume such a narrow view. Instead, by taking up and refining arguments made by commentators such as Nicholas Dent, Joshua Cohen, and 474 Reviews r 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.