Assessing the Causal Structure of Function Sergio E. Chaigneau University of Tarapaca and Emory University Lawrence W. Barsalou Emory University Steven A. Sloman Brown University Theories typically emphasize affordances or intentions as the primary determinant of an object’s perceived function. The HIPE theory assumes that people integrate both into causal models that produce functional attributions. In these models, an object’s physical structure and an agent’s action specify an affordance jointly, constituting the immediate causes of a perceived function. The object’s design history and an agent’s goal in using it constitute distant causes. When specified fully, the immediate causes are sufficient for determining the perceived function— distant causes have no effect (the causal proximity principle). When the immediate causes are ambiguous or unknown, distant causes produce inferences about the immediate causes, thereby affecting functional attributions indirectly (the causal updating principle). Seven experiments supported HIPE’s predictions. Function is a central construct in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive psychologists have shown that the cate- gorization of an artifact depends not only on its physical proper- ties, but also on its function (e.g., Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Keil, 1989; Rips, 1989; but see Malt & Johnson, 1992; Malt & Sloman, in press). Developmental psychologists have shown this as well (e.g., Gentner, 1978; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Keil, 1989; Kemler-Nelson, 1995; Tomikawa & Dodd, 1980; Tversky, 1989; but see Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1998; Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1996). Indeed, children as young as 2 years old use function in categorization (e.g., Kemler-Nelson, Russell, Duke, & Jones, 2000). Function also plays a central role in inductive inference for both adults (e.g., Heit & Rubinstein, 1994; Medin, Lynch, Coley, & Atran, 1997; Ross & Murphy, 1999) and children (e.g., Gelman, 1988; Keil, 1989; but see Farrar, Raney, & Boyer, 1992). Chaigneau and Barsalou (in press) reviewed factors that modulate the effects of function in categorization and inference across children and adults. In neuroscience, function has played a central role in theories of lesion-based categorical deficits (e.g., Cree & McRae, 2003; War- rington & Shallice, 1984). Knowledge about function has been localized in brain systems that implement action (e.g., Chao & Martin, 2000; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003; Martin, 2001). In artificial intelligence, researchers have developed computational accounts of function (e.g., Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 2000; Forbus, 1993). Philosophers have also developed accounts (e.g., Wimsatt, 1972; Wright, 1973). The Affordance Versus Intention Debate Recently a debate has arisen in developmental psychology about the sense of function that is most important as people represent and process categories. On the one hand, researchers who hold the affordance view argue that an object’s functional affordance is the sense of function most central to category processing. Following Gibson (1950, 1979), an affordance is the perceived use of an object given by its physical structure and an agent’s physical capabilities. A chair’s physical structure, together with a human’s physical capabilities, affords the function of sitting. Conversely, a chair’s physical structure, together with a whale’s capabilities, does not. In support of this view, researchers have shown that young children attend to affordance information and use it cen- trally in categorization (e.g., Kemler-Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blair, 2000; Kemler-Nelson, Russell, et al., 2000; Madole & Oakes, in press; Smith, 1999). On the other side of the debate, researchers who hold the intentional view argue that an object’s design history is the sense of function most central to category processing (e.g., Bloom, 1996, 1998; Diesendruck, Markson, & Bloom, 2003; Gelman & Bloom, Sergio E. Chaigneau, Department of Psychology, University of Tara- paca, Arica, Chile, and Department of Psychology, Emory University; Lawrence W. Barsalou, Department of Psychology, Emory University; and Steven A. Sloman, Department of Cognitive and Linguistic Services, Brown University. This work was supported by National Science Foundation Grants SBR- 9421326, SBR-9796200, and BCS-0212134 to Lawrence W. Barsalou; by financial support from the University of Tarapaca to Sergio E. Chaigneau; and by National Aeronautics and Space Administration Grant NCC2-1217 to Steven A. Sloman. We are grateful to Shurin Hase and Courtney Emery for assistance in running these experiments. We are also grateful to Woo-kyoung Ahn, Bob Rehder, and Kyle Simmons for helpful comments on this work and to Woo-kyoung Ahn, Art Glenberg, and Kyle Simmons for helpful comments on this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sergio E. Chaigneau, Department of Psychology, University of Tarapaca, Dieciocho de Septiembre 2222, Arica, Chile, or to Lawrence W. Barsalou, Depart- ment of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322. E-mail: schaigne@uta.cl or barsalou@emory.edu Journal of Experimental Psychology: General Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association 2004, Vol. 133, No. 4, 601– 625 0096-3445/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0096-3445.133.4.601 601