Turkish Studies International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 10/6 Spring 2015, p. 901-922 DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.7827/TurkishStudies.7904 ISSN: 1308-2140, ANKARA-TURKEY ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF EMOTIONS  Aslı YAZICI ** STRUCTURED ABSTRACT Introduction This paper reconstruct a general picture of Aristotle’s theory of emotion developed in his major works. Most commentators express hesitation about whether it is possible to reconstruct such a theory of emotion in Aristotle’s philosophy. Though I agree with much of the concern they raise, I still believe that there exists a coherent, somehow well-grounded, theory of emotion in Aristotle’s philosophy. I argue that Aristotle’s account of emotion cannot be interpreted as a pure cognitivism, like the Stoic’s theory of emotion, or as a strong physicalism. Identifying different aspects of Aristotle’s account of emotion, I have tried to demonstrate that there is a logical and conceptual connection between these different aspects such that both cognitive and affective aspects co-exist in his theory of emotions. Section one and two provide the metaphysical and psychological bases of Aristotle’s theory of emotion. Section three is an attempt to identify the physical aspect of emotions in Aristotle, the aspect which he takes as essential to emotions. The cognitive aspect, in section four, deals with emotions in terms of beliefs, intentionality, and having the power of changing judgments. I conclude the paper with a discussion on the relationship between action and emotion in Aristotle. 1. The Metaphysical Basis of Emotions In the Metaphysics Aristotle offers four different senses of “pathos,” with a larger metaphysical concern. In Aristotle, “pathos” does not refer to what we call “emotion,” though it has a close conceptual connection with it, but rather to “affection,” “experience” or “alteration.”In the Categories a quality, Aristotle says, is something in virtue of which both things and people are qualified (Aristotle, 1984:9a32, 9b23-27). While Aristotle explicitly points out that there are different kinds of quality in respect of which people and things can be qualified (Aristotle, 1984:10a25), he thinks that these can be grouped and discussed under four major headings or kinds: (i) states and conditions, (ii) natural capacities and incapacities, (iii) external form of a thing, (iv) affections (pathē) and affective qualities.  Bu makale Crosscheck sistemi tarafından taranmış ve bu sistem sonuçlarına göre orijinal bir makale olduğu tespit edilmiştir. ** Doç. Dr. Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Bölümü, El -mek: ayaziciasli@hotmail.com