S.-Afi. Trdskr. \\')sb. 199t. 16(1) A comrnu*.it'arian framework for understanding Iiberal social practices? Patrick Giddy Deiadment of Philosophy, University of Durban-Westville, Private Bag X54001. Durban 4000, South Africa Received October 1996: ret,ised Decentber 1 995 Respecl lor the creatirritr.'ar-t6 L*aror1 of eyer.,,individual is an attitude rvortn prcseriins and llnds expres5ioll in rarious liberal social institutioirs- But at th3 sarne time those institutions u'ili tend to become corrupied if rheir mcral fbundations are not acknorvledsed and lhe conditions for freedom to develop not fostered. fhe communitarian notion of a social practice as foundational in rnoraliS,can rvell sen,e to complement the unCerstandins of fi-eedom in liberalisr thoueht- It has the potential lor integralirg in our understandir-rg ofn-roral values, the findings ofthe sircial sciences concernins the various social andps-''chological conditionsforirumanderelopment. lnorderforthisnoriontoservethisfuncrionitlsnecessar'1 ro brins in some lbrm of transcendental argument Ibr morality of the kind that Lonersan provides. Lonergan's theorl oi' knor,,iedge helps us to place the findings ofthe social sciences in respect ofthe eflectuation ofhuuran fieedont u,ithirr the fiaire*'ork ofthe necessarl sei ofconditions defining such freedonr. Respek vir die l:reatirviteit en vn,heid van elkc indiridu is 'n rvaardevolle houCing en vind urtdrukking in verskeie liberaie sosi:rle insleiiings. I\4aar terselfden-r,d sa.1 hierdie instellings neig tot korrupsie indien hu1 morele begrondinse nie erken ri'ord en die voonvaardes r-ir die vrvheid om te ontr.vikkel nie beskerm tvord nie. Die kontmunitaristiese nosie r,an 'n sosiale prakrvk as die begronding van moraliieit kan *'el die liberalistiese begrip van vn,heici kornplimenteer. Dit het die potensiaal on-r die bevirrdinge van die sosiale we{.enskappe rvat betref die r,erskeie sosiale en psigoloeiese voorvn'aardes vir menslike ontn'ikkeling te integreer in ons verstaan van morele waardes. Vir hierdie nosie om sodzrnrse funksie te vervul, is dit nood- saaklik orr 'n vorm ran 'n transendentale argument."'ir moraliteit in te bring- Lonergan verskalso 'n argument. Sy, kennis, teorie help ons cn die bevindinge van die sosiale rietenskappe rakende die realiserins van menslike vrlheici te plaas birute die raamu'erk van die noodsaaklike stel r.'ooruaardes \\'at sodanise r,rvheid dcfinieer. I I outline in this paner a u,af in u'hich tlie findings of the social sciences rna\, be seen to contribute to our undeistaliding ofethics and in par-ticular to u'hat is perhaps the centrai value in the liberal tradition. r'iz. tl.re creatit,ity and freedom of ever), individual. The kef idea in this project 1 rake to be thc normative notion of a social practice as developed b,v Alisdair N4aclnry*re. Maclntvre's communitarian approach takes seriousl.v the findings of the social sciences as to the determining influences in human behav- ioui. and seeks to rethink the frameu'ork for moral discourse in that light. But I .,i iil question u'hether his proposal, as ir stands. is in the final analvsis really adequate. Hence the question mark in the title. In order to give coherence to moral debate (and not sim- .l), to favour or.re kind of society over against another) u.hat are needed are general criteria for evaluating the u,orth ofanv coop- erative social actir,it_v. Coniernporar_-l liberal society is reluctant, as Charles Tavlor argues (1989: 10; cf. 75-90), to articulate the 'nioral ontology' ur.rderpinning our values. \4aclntyre on tlie otirer hand doubts that the Aristotelian-influenced moral argu- ments he advances could be rnade intelligible u'ithin the contexl of a different tradition - the modern liberal, to be specific.r I think his doubt is unfounded. and I seek here to shou,rvh1,. I il'ill suggest a wa,u- of supplementing the notion of a social practice so as to provide a critical moral foundation to u.hatever is of true value in our liberal social instintiions - representative democracy' and a reasonabll free nrarket. for example. lr4odern \vestern tirought and practice has been guided by tlie central value of individual human freedorn. But this notion has generalll'onlv expressed the bare notion ofessential freedom: to such a notion one can juxtapose all those rvays in rvhich u'e are coustrained bv enr,irontlental factors of biological. sociological and psychological kinds. I suggest n.raking an intuitively,evident distinction berrveen the fact ofessential freedom and the question to u'hat extent that essential fieedom is in any particular case actualised. that is betrveen essential and effective freedcm. For example, the ideal of being faithfull_v married can be put along- side the achievemenr thereof. or one can think of the u,l.s/r to be a good parent. rather than a rival of one's children anci their de- manCs. I am rhiirking here of freedom as the capacitv to deter- mine one's Iife. The bare facl of that capacitl is termed essential freedonr: the transfonuation ofthe capacitl, into an abilitl'woulC be effective fieedont. The appropriatiou oftire capacity for free- donr rvould entail a grori.tlt in self-understanding rvhich could be illustrated in the exan.rples above of ntarriage and parenting. 11 rvould also involve a gro\\th in the extent to uhich one is able ro be consistent in carifing througl.r into practice one's understaud- ing ofrvhat one oueht to do. One classical text for the discussiorr of questioirs such as these is that of Aristotle's,\,ron;achean Ethics. One thinks in parricu- lar of his analvsis of tire dispositions of character that le?,d to consistently good behaviour (Book Il) and of u,eakness of u,ill and strength of character (Book \III). Srill the gro\\,th of rhe social sciences has chairged the shape ofthe relevant intellectual context for these questions. Our unrierstanding of the regulari- ties. sociai and psy,chological. rvhich circumscribe and in part determine human behaviour rnust nou,conform to the canons of empirical method. Fufthermore. rvl.rile for Aristotle 'man' is used as a functional and nont.rative concept this is not the case in rnod- ern thought.2 A reconsiderarion of the foundations for the moral evaluation ofbehaviour is therefore necessary ifrr.,e are to use, in ethics. either the insights of Aristotle or the findings of a content- porarl'genius such as, for exarrple. Freud.i N,lac1nt1're's notiou of a social practice can be seen as ioundational. I suggest. because it points at once to the fact of essential human freedom (the capacitl'to shire a conceptual u,orlcl associated u,ith the practice and to act for reaisor.is of its internal goods) and at thc same time to the developrlent of the virlues to make that fi'ee- don.i effective (r.vhich involves adhering to numerous principies 'of the trade').4 Hou,ever I u,ill argue that it does not quite do the job. and needs to be supplen'rented riith an analysis of hur.nan raiionaiitv tliat takes into accounr the empiricai metliod of mod- ern science. F or this purpc)se I u.ill drarv upon the u'ritings cf the