Expressing, Showing and Representing Mitchell Green Abstract: Research concerned with emotion and expression commonly distinguishes expressive from representational acts and artifacts without further elucidating that distinction. I here take steps toward such an elucidation by, first (Section 1) characterizing self-expression as behavior in which one designedly shows an aspect of one’s psychological state. The states we express may be cognitive, affective or experiential. The showing at issue makes knowledge available. The design may be a result of natural selection, artificial selection, cultural evolution, or individual intention where this latter is construed widely enough to include acquired automaticity. Expression per se is then defined in terms of self-expression and expressiveness. I then argue that expressed emotions may in some instances be perceived (Section 2), after which I consider (Section 3) implications for this position in light of recent challenges to a view of emotions as natural kinds. I then (4) defend a view of speech acts as institutions whose role is to extend the scope of those states we can express beyond those we make perceptible, and broaden this perspective (5) to slurs in the course of advocating an expressivist perspective thereon. I then (6) propose that metaphors are often used to aid speakers in expressing affective states by showing others how they feel. Speech acts, slurs and metaphors are all representational, and yet each wields substantial expressive powers. Contents: 1. Expression as genitive or generic 2. Some emotions are perceptible 3. If emotions are not natural kinds… 4. Speech acts 5. Charged language 6. Expressive figures