Repertoires of Domination: Decentralization as Process in Botswana and Senegal AMY R. POTEETE Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada and JESSE C. RIBOT * University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA Summary. — Decentralization promises to empower local actors, but threatens others with a loss of power. We describe “repertoires of domination” as the set of acts actors perform to defend—or entrench and expand—their positions. We illustrate, through case studies of decentralization in natural resource sectors in Botswana and Senegal, how repertoires of domination prevent local-level democratization. The concept of repertoire brings attention to the availability of multiple, substitutable acts of domination that draw upon varied sources of power. Neither decentralization nor democratization can be achieved once and for all. These processes are both advanced and halted through acts of contestation. Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Key words — domination, decentralization, natural resource management, democratization, Africa, Botswana, Senegal 1. INTRODUCTION Decentralization promises improvements in efficiency, responsiveness to spatially variable conditions, and greater opportunities for citizen participation and empowerment. In theory, these outcomes hinge on how decentralization alters relations of authority and, especially, the allocation of power to broadly representative and downwardly accountable local actors (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Blair, 2000). To enhance lo- cal democracy, decentralization must increase opportunities for local people to participate in binding forms of consulta- tion (representation with accountability) and provide access to significant material resources and decision-making author- ity (Crook & Manor, 1998; Ribot, Chhatre, & Lankina, 2008). Despite national-level political struggles around legislation (Eaton, Kaiser, & Smoke, 2009; Heller, 2001), decentralization reforms have been widely promulgated. In implementation, however, central actors as well as local-level officials, tradi- tional leaders, and commercial elites, resist the loss of power. Although successes have been documented, instances of local democratic empowerment through decentralization are few and far between (Blair, 2000; Crook & Manor, 1998; Fung & Wright, 2003; Heller, 2001; Ribot, 2004). Disappointments with decentralization are often attributed to institutional problems, suggesting that improvements can be gained with greater attention to “getting the institutions right” (Fung & Wright, 2003; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Manor, 2004; Wunsch, 2001). Responsibilities of local actors are often increased, while their authority to make significant local decisions is not. Onerous requirements and inadequate finances limit the ability of local actors to exercise new powers that are formally within their reach. Alternatively, reforms devolve meaningful authority to local actors who are not accountable to a broadly defined local community (Manor, 2004; Ribot, 2004; Ribot et al., 2008; Wittayapak & Vandergeest, 2009). These problems are not simply the products of flawed insti- tutional design (Tacconi, Siagian, & Syam, 2006; Wittayapak & Vandergeest, 2009). They reflect the political contestation surrounding decentralization programs. Decentralization pro- grams are typically presented as enhancing local democracy and development, yet are motivated by many other political and economic concerns or crises (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Alden Wily & Mbaya, 2001; Barrow, Gichohi, & Infield, 2001; Bazaara, 2006; O’Neill, 2003; Ribot, 2004). Regardless of motives, powerful actors—including governments promot- ing decentralization—resist local empowerment at every step (Bates, 1983; Blaikie, 2006; Ribot & Oyono, 2005; Wunsch, 2001). Centripetal forces are a constant aspect of decentralization reforms, manifest through many different acts. Central actors counteract the loss of powers by blocking the transfer of meaningful powers to local authorities or by only “transfer- ring” powers to local actors they can control (Ribot, 2004). Other agencies, NGOs, and commercial interests gain power by positioning themselves as intermediaries between center and local, while resisting both central oversight and downward * We have benefitted from thoughtful comments from Catherine Boone, John Harbeson, Sandra Joireman, Staffan Lindberg, Aurelien Mauxion, Innocent Ndahiriwe, Andrea Nightingale, Hemant Ojha, Leander Schnei- der, Thomas Sikor, and Peter von Doepp, as well as enriching exchanges during the Workshop on the Workshop IV at Indiana University in June 2009. Thanks for the Government of Botswana’s permission to conduct research in the Botswana; financial support from the Fulbright Founda- tion, the Social Science Research Council, and the University of New Orleans; institutional support from the University of Botswana, and help from respondents and friends in Botswana. Sincere thanks to the Dutch Royal Embassy in Dakar, in particular Franke Toornstra, for supporting the research behind the Senegal case study. Final revision accepted: Au- gust 6, 2010. World Development Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 439–449, 2011 Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved 0305-750X/$ - see front matter www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.09.013 439