Adam Eckerd is assistant professor in the Center for Public Administration and Policy at Virginia Tech, where he conducts research on the complex relationship between government decisions and social outcomes, particularly with respect to environmental justice, public participation, and nonprofit organizations. He holds a doctorate from the John Glenn School of Public Affairs at The Ohio State University. E-mail: aeckerd@vt.edu Roy L. Heidelberg is assistant professor in the Public Administration Institute at Louisiana State University. His research focuses on power and accountability in administrative contexts. He holds a doctor- ate from the John Glenn School of Public Affairs at The Ohio State University. E-mail: royh@lsu.edu 252 Public Administration Review • March | April 2015 Public Administration Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 2, pp. 252–261. © 2014 by The American Society for Public Administration. DOI: 10.1111/puar.12305. Adam Eckerd Virginia Tech Roy L. Heidelberg Louisiana State University P ublic policies are often shaped by prominent public management frameworks or designed with particular management frameworks in mind (May and Winter 2009). In the 1980s and 1990s, the focus of environmental policy shifted to concentrate less on regulation and enforcement and more on incentives and legal protection (Jaffe et al. 1995). he timing of this change coincided (perhaps not coincidentally) with the rise of the New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991), and the various efforts to motivate private involvement with con- taminated site remediation and redevelopment align closely with NPM principles. Essential to NPM is the use of incentives as a policy instrument to engage pri- vate sector firms as partners, a focus that functionally replaces regulation (DeLeon and Denhardt 2000). he federal efforts to address contaminated sites through liability reform are an excellent example: regulation is restricted so that incentives can be made more effective and the power of the market can be lev- eraged. Our primary interest is in the extent to which various liability reform and incentive policies spur private sector involvement in site remediation. In line with NPM expectations, developers have indicated that their involvement in cleanup activities would increase with protections from liability (Wernstedt, Meyer, and Alberini 2006), similar to those imple- mented through amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) in 2002. he 2002 amendments are situated under a different managerial logic than the 1980 law. While the regulatory focus of the 1980 law implies a managerial approach of direct implementation to balance various priorities, the market-oriented focus of the 2002 amendments emphasizes getting incentives right and a more indi- rect approach to final outcomes. We address three main research questions through an evaluation of data from the Brownfield Assessment Grant Program of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). A hallmark of NPM is a results-oriented focus and engagement with the Public Incentives, Market Motivations, and Contaminated Properties: New Public Management and Brownfield Liability Reform Abstract: Brownfields pose challenges to both communities and policy makers. Public funds are insufficient to remedi- ate these contaminated sites, but, given the uncertainty of contamination and the complexity of liability, private interests are reluctant to become involved for fear of future litigation. From a New Public Management perspective, market incentives can be used to encourage private sector remediation of sites. However, this change implies a shift in administrative function from regulation to “getting the incentives right.” In this research, the authors investigate whether state and federal reforms aimed at increasing private sector involvement have actually done so, and they con- sider the implications for other goals of brownfield remediation, such as providing economic development assistance in communities where such change is needed. Findings show that developers respond to insurance and tax incentives, but the authors question whether public incentives are making unattractive redevelopment opportunities worth investing in or simply making profitable redevelopment opportunities more profitable. Practitioner Points • Practitioners involved in brownfield remediation must try to distinguish between incentivizing already attractive projects and encouraging remediation of projects that would otherwise be neglected. • A hands-off approach to steering brownfield remediation may not adequately address the uncertainty intrin- sic to remediation, even with promises of liability protection. • Focusing resources on spurring private sector involvement will necessarily prioritize economic development over health and equity considerations. • Governments may need to take a more balanced approach to brownfield remediation by taking ownership of and planning for redevelopment in communities where private sector involvement is less likely.