1 Deflationary Normative Naturalism Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter University of Melbourne Normative naturalists have been on the defensive lately. Non-naturalists have highlighted what they take to be fundamental structural inadequacies of the naturalist approach to the normative domain. 1 A core critique they level at naturalism is that it cannot vindicate two central requirements on an adequate account of normativity. The first requirement is non-reductionism: (NR): The properties picked out by normative terms are sui generis: they are not reducible to naturalistic properties, such as psychological properties, or properties that play a genuine role in causal explanations. Non-naturalists typically suggest that the mathematical domain provides a good model for thinking about the normative domain, since both mathematics and morals posit objects or properties that are sui generis and lie outside of the causal realm studied by the natural sciences. 2 In David Enoch’s words, normative properties are “just too different” to be reduced to naturalistic properties. 3 They must be posited over and above anything in the naturalistic realm. The second requirement concerns the objectivity of normative truths: (O): Normative truths are perfectly objective, universal, absolute. 4 Non-naturalists reject any form of subjectivism, relativism, or context-dependence about core normative truths, such as truths concerning morality or all-out reasons. So claims like “Torturing babies is wrong” or “You have reasons to take care of your own health” are true absolutely, independently of any subjective normative attitude or commitment one might have. In response to non-naturalists’ critiques, we show how a deflationary form of naturalism can vindicate both (NR) and (O). We start by highlighting the metasemantic commitments incurred by any proponent of (O) (section 1). In section 2, we introduce a general metasemantic framework which, we think, has broad appeal. We show how this framework can yield a form of naturalism capable of vindicating (NR). We call this brand of naturalism ‘deflationary’, since it does not involve any reduction, and respects the analogy with mathematics in eschewing 1 To simplify our exposition we’ll focus here on two best articulated strands of normative non-naturalism: the metaphysically committed (represented by self- described ‘Robust Realists’ (FitzPatrick 2008; Enoch 2011)) and the metaphysically light, non-committed (represented by self-described ‘Reasons Fundamentalists’ (Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014)). Whereas proponents of these two strands disagree on the question whether normative properties are mere ontological “shadows” of normative predicates, they offer similar core criticisms of normative naturalism. 2 (Parfit 2011; Enoch 2011; Scanlon 2014) all support the mathematical analogy. (FitzPatrick 2008) is an exception here, since he defends the causal efficacy of the normative. FitzPatrick nonetheless endorses the spirit of (NR). 3 (Enoch 2011, 80). 4 This formulation is borrowed from (Enoch 2011, 1). We clarify how (O) should be understood in section 1.