Pluralism and the Hobbesian Logic of Negative Constitutionalism DUNCAN IVISON* University of Sydney According to an essentially Hobbesian account of political order, the claims of cultural and national minorities within a state to some form of constitutional or institutional recognition are morally suspect and politically undesirable. Underlying this Hobbesian logic is a particular understanding of the relation between law and politics. `Negative constitutionalism' is focused primarily on limiting the damage government can do. However the pursuit of constitutional minimalism runs up against the challenges presented by deeply diverse political communities. By investi- gating the manner in which Hobbes has been invoked in arguments concerning the relation between the rule of law and the `politics of recognition', I argue (i) that the distinction between the rule of law and politics is fundamentally unstable, and (ii) that in invoking Hobbes, modern theorists have missed an important element of Hobbes's own argument ± namely, his appreciation of this instability. As an example, I examine the way Hobbes is used in some of John Gray's recent writings on pluralism and liberalism. According to an essentially Hobbesian account of political order, the claims of cultural and national minorities within a state to some form of constitutional or institutional recognition are morally suspect and politically undesirable. The `politics' of such claims ± a term we shall have to unpack ± is said to have undesirable consequences for the constitutional order of a political community. Underlying this Hobbesian logic is a particular understanding of the relation between law and politics; call it `negative constitutionalism'. The focus here is primarily on the extent to which the constitution is meant to limit the damage a state can do. But this seems an incomplete formulation of what constitution- alism means. Constitutions are partly about preventing abuses of power, but are also about more positive things too. The pursuit of constitutional minimalism runs up against the challenges presented by deeply diverse political commu- nities. By investigating the manner in which Hobbes has been invoked in arguments concerning the relation between the rule of law and the politics of recognition, I hope to show (i) that the distinction between the rule of law and politics is fundamentally unstable and (ii) that in invoking Hobbes, modern theorists have missed an important element of Hobbes's own argument ± namely, his appreciation of this instability. #Political Studies Association 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 83±99 * I am grateful to Annabel Brett, Barry Hindess, Matt Matravers, Susan Mendus, Philip Pettit and various anonymous readers for their generous help and comments with regard to this paper.