In Doubt and Disorderly: Ambivalence Promotes Compensatory Perceptions of Order Frenk van Harreveld and Bastiaan T. Rutjens University of Amsterdam Iris K. Schneider VU University of Amsterdam Hannah U. Nohlen and Konstantinos Keskinis University of Amsterdam Ambivalence is a presumably unpleasant experience, and coming to terms with it is an intricate part of human existence. It is argued that ambivalent attitude holders cope with their ambivalence through compensatory perceptions of order. We first show that ambivalence leads to an increase in (visual) perceptions of order (Study 1). In Study 2 we conceptually replicate this finding by showing that ambivalence also increases belief in conspiracy theories, a cognitive form of order perception. Further- more, this effect is mediated by the negative emotions that are elicited by ambivalence. In Study 3 we show that increased need for order is driving these effects: Affirmations of order cancel out the effect of ambivalence on perceptions of order. Theoretical as well as societal implications are discussed. Keywords: ambivalence, attitudes, perceptions of order, compensatory coping, uncertainty As a result of the inborn conflict arising from ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between the trends of love and death—there is inex- tricably bound up with it an increase of the sense of guilt, which will perhaps reach heights that the individual finds hard to tolerate. —–Freud (1930/1964, p. 133). Many scholars in the social sciences have argued that ambiva- lence is a primordial and unpleasant experience. Freud (1930/ 1964) saw the unpleasant nature of ambivalence as an intrinsic part of human existence, because, in his view, all intimate relationships contain a certain degree of ambivalence. Freud’s notion that am- bivalence is an intrinsic part of human existence is supported by research that has, for example, shown ambivalence in parent– child relationships (Luescher & Pillemer, 1998); toward abortion (Al- varez & Brehm, 1995), men (Glick & Fiske, 1999), eating meat (Povey, Wellens, & Conner, 2001), presidential candidates (Lavine, 2001), pregnancy (Brückner, Martin, & Bearman, 2004), marriage (Signorielli, 1991), dieting (Armitage & Arden, 2007), methadone treatment (Rosenblum, Magura, & Joseph, 1992), and different ethnic groups (Katz & Hass, 1988); among scientists (Mitroff, 1974); and between lovers sorting out their relationship (Wiseman, 1976). Social psychological research supports the idea that ambiva- lence is undesirable, with researchers arguing that ambivalence can be unpleasant because it constitutes a violation of fundamental consistency motives (e.g., Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997; Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996; McGregor, Newby-Clark, & Zanna, 1999; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002; Nordgren, van Harrev- eld, & van der Pligt, 2006). This undesirable nature has been shown by studies relating ambivalence to physiological arousal (van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009), negative mood (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992), narcissism (Slater & Slater, 1965), negative behavior toward stig- matized persons (Katz, 1981), membership in countercultural groups (Yinger, 1982), and even burnout, schizophrenia, and vic- timization (cf. Coser, 1976; Wexler, 1983). Given the ubiquitous as well as unpleasant nature of ambiva- lence, it becomes important to understand how people cope with ambivalence. As such, the current research aims to investigate ways through which people aim to compensate for the unpleasant experience of ambivalence. We suggest in particular that ambiv- alence inherently is an experience of disorder that people cope with by compensatory perceptions of order. Defining and Distinguishing Ambivalence Ambivalence shares features with other inconsistency-related psychological threats, such as cognitive dissonance or general uncertainty; however, it can be conceptually distinguished from these constructs in several ways. First, on a structural level, am- bivalence can be understood as a state in which an individual “is inclined to give it [an attitude object] equivalently strong positive or negative evaluations” (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995, p. 367). Ambivalence is thus an intra-attitudinal discrepancy contrary This article was published Online First March 3, 2014. Frenk van Harreveld and Bastiaan T. Rutjens, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Iris K. Schneider, Department of Clinical Psychology, VU University of Am- sterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Hannah U. Nohlen and Konstanti- nos Keskinis, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. We thank Jennifer Whitson for providing us with the modified snowy pictures task. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Frenk van Harreveld, University of Amsterdam, Department of Social Psychol- ogy, Weesperplein 4, 1018 XA Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail: f.vanharreveld@uva.nl This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General © 2014 American Psychological Association 2014, Vol. 143, No. 4, 1666 –1676 0096-3445/14/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0036099 1666