© LOGOS & EPISTEME, V, 4 (2014): 445-464 MOORE’S PARADOX AND EPISTEMIC NORMS Patrizio LO PRESTI ABSTRACT: Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because violating norms. KEYWORDS: Moore’s paradox, epistemic norms, normative explanation, absurdity 1. Moorean Absurdity G.E. Moore 1 said that there’s something ‘absurd’ with asserting, “It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining.” Moore also found believing “He has gone out, but he hasn’t” absurd. He found it paradoxical that the absurdity persists despite the possible truth of the proposition asserted or believed. 2 There are circumstances in which it is true both that it is raining and that I do not believe that it is raining. However, it appears absurd to assert, or believe, that it is raining and that I don’t believe it. That, in a nutshell, is Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox displays two faces: a linguistic and a psychological. 3 The linguistic paradox is that it might be true both that it is raining and that I don’t believe it although it would be strange of me to assert both. The psychological paradox is that it might be true both that it is raining and that I don’t believe that 1 G.E. Moore, “A Reply to My Critics,” in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. P.A. Schlipp (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1942), 533-677. See also G.E. Moore, “Russell’s Theory of Descriptions,” in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. P.A. Schlipp (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1944), 175-225. 2 Thomas Baldwin, G. E. Moore: Selected Writings (London: Routledge, 1993). This point has also been made in D.M. Rosenthal, “Self-Knowledge and Moore’s Paradox,” Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 195-209. 3 Jordi Fernández, “Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore’s Paradox,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71, 3 (2005): 533-556; Sydney Shoemaker, “Moore’s Paradox and Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 211-228.