1 W.T. Harris, Peirce, and the Charge of Nominalism to appear in spring 2015 issue of Hegel Bulletin (Special Issue on Pragmatism) David W. Agler Marco Stango Abstract While a number of classical pragmatists crafted their philosophies in conjunction with a careful study of Hegel’s works, others saw their philosophies emerge in antagonism with proponents of Hegel. In this paper, we offer an instance of the latter case. Namely, we show that the impetus for Charles S. Peirce’s early articulation and avowal of realism (the claim that some generals are real) was William Torrey Harris’s claim that the formal laws of logic lacked universal validity. According to Harris, the leading representative of Hegel in the United States, the universal validity of the laws of logic rested on a nominalistic metaphysics that a Hegelian-realism showed to be false. In response to this charge, we articulate how Peirce’s attempt to prove the universal validity of the laws of logic resulted in avowing a realism that differed from both nominalism and Harris’s Hegelian-realism. Charles S. Peirce’s relationship with Hegel is complicated to say the least. 1 On the one hand, Peirce never seemed to tire of leveling criticisms at Hegel. 2 Peirce referred to Hegel’s whole method as ‘flummery’, his phenomenology bereft of mathematics as a ‘pitiful club-footed affair’, 3 and went so far as to write that ‘my whole method will be found in profound contrast with that of Hegel; I reject his philosophy in toto.’ 4 On the other hand, Peirce was also strikingly cognizant of how similar their philosophies were. 5 Such similarities led Peirce to say that his own doctrine was ‘a variety of Hegelianism’, 6 that his ‘philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume’, 7 and that ‘in some respects [Hegel was] the greatest philosopher that ever lived.’ 8 The aim of this issue is to investigate what connections exist between (neo-)pragmatists and Hegel. While several pragmatists developed their own philosophy through a direct reading of Hegel’s texts, others saw their philosophical views mature under antagonism with self-proclaimed disciples of Hegel. In this paper, we offer an instance of the latter case. Namely, we shall argue that Peirce’s early articulation of realism (the claim that some generals are real) developed under pressure from an early proponent of Hegel’s philosophy in the United States: William Torrey Harris (1835– 1909). The claim that Peirce was, early on, a realist is not without controversy as a number of Peirce scholars have argued that Peirce’s early statements about the nominalism-realist debate reflect a commitment to nominalism. In addition, the fact that early in their correspondence Peirce never denied Harris’s characterization of him as an extreme nominalist seems to further support this view. We, however, argue that the characterization of Peirce as a nominalist is mistaken. Peirce’s reluctance to avow realism in the context of his quarrel with Harris was partly due to the fact that Peirce’s realism stood in stark contrast to Harris’s Hegelian-inspired realism. 1. PEIRCE AND HARRIS IN 1867 The first issue of Journal of Speculative Philosophy (JSP) appeared in January of 1867. After a four issue run, W. T. Harris, 9 the Hegelian founder of the JSP, 10 wrapped up the volume with a preface that responded to criticisms of the journal’s content. The two primary criticisms of the journal were (i)