4 2015 Since the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the spectre of ‘hybrid’ tactics (or threats) is haunt- ing both European and American security debates. This seems to suggest that this is a new, highly ef- fective form of warfare which poses complex chal- lenges to the EU, NATO, and their neighbours. However, hybrid tactics are neither new, nor ex- clusively (or primarily) a Russian invention. They are as old as war itself, and Western states have often used elements of it quite effectively, at least on a tactical level. East, West, and Middle East Hybrid war encompasses a set of hostile actions whereby, instead of a classical large-scale military invasion, an attacking power seeks to undermine its opponent through a variety of acts includ- ing subversive intelligence operations, sabotage, hacking, and the empowering of proxy insurgent groups. It may also spread disinformation (in tar- get and third countries), exert economic pressure and threaten energy supplies. In order to be successfully executed, a degree of integration between these elements is required, as is their subordination to some sort of strategic command. It is also imperative that the aggres- sor be in a position to plausibly deny having sup- ported these actions to the local and international communities. Similar methods have been seen long before the conflict in Ukraine – often in the run-up to, dur- ing, and immediately after conventional wars. Bribing someone to open the gates of a castle un- der siege or the poisoning of wells, for example, were the medieval equivalents to today’s hybrid tactics. More recently, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 began with 700 special forces troops wearing Afghan uniforms – many of them Soviet Muslims who were chosen so that they could blend into the local environment – seizing key military, media and government buildings, including President Amin’s palace. On a technical level, many of the actions undertaken by the Soviets back then are strikingly similar to the ones Russia employed in Crimea last year. The US has also made effective use of hybrid tactics: notably against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and then again immediately before its attempt to dislodge the Taliban with Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. But the US has also suffered many casualties as a result of this type of warfare – in Afghanistan itself and also in Iraq. What military experts call ‘asymmetric’ warfare could also fall into this category. In Lebanon, for example, Hizbullah went from mounting tradi- tional guerrilla operations during the country’s civil war to making use of hybrid warfare during its conflict with the Israeli army in 2006. Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian by Nicu Popescu EAST NEWS/SIPA European Union Institute for Security Studies January 2015 1