1 The Physiognomy of Responsibility John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini john.fischer@ucr.edu neal.tognazzini@wwu.edu Penultimate version Final version in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research http://philpapers.org/rec/FISTPO-3 Our aim in this paper is to put the concept of moral responsibility under a microscope. At the lowest level of magnification, it appears unified. But Gary Watson has taught us that if we zoom in, we will find that moral responsibility has two faces: attributability and accountability. 1 It is one thing to talk about the connection the agent has with her action; it is quite another to talk about the potential interaction the agent might have with her moral community. 2 It turns out, though, that the faces of moral responsibility can themselves be viewed under an even higher level of magnification. If moral responsibility has two faces, then our aim in this paper is to examine their features. To do so reveals subtle distinctions in our concept of moral responsibility and its interaction with surrounding issues that, we argue, can help illuminate various debates in the literature. 3 1. Attributability: Aretaic and Reactive We begin our examination with attributability because there is a sense in which questions about attributability are analytically prior to questions about accountability. We shall then proceed stepwise through each analytical “stage” or “step” on our way to accountability of the strongest sort. It is important to keep in mind, however, that our use of the terms