1 Exploring Evil and Philosophical Failure: A Critical Notice of Peter van Inwagen’s The Problem of Evil 1 John Martin Fischer and Neal A. Tognazzini john.fischer@ucr.edu neal.tognazzini@wwu.edu Penultimate version Final version in Faith and Philosophy http://philpapers.org/rec/TOGEEA In his recent book on the problem of evil, Peter van Inwagen argues that both the global and local arguments from evil are failures. In this paper, we engage van Inwagen’s book at two main points. First, we consider his understanding of what it takes for a philosophical argument to succeed. We argue that while his criterion for success is interesting and helpful, there is good reason to think it is too stringent. Second, we consider his responses to the global and local arguments from evil. We argue that although van Inwagen may have adequately responded to each of these arguments, his discussion points us to a third argument from evil to which he has yet to provide a response. Introduction This book presents somewhat revised versions of the Gifford Lectures, delivered by Peter van Inwagen at the University of St. Andrews in 2003. The lectures provide a systematic response to various versions of the problem of evil. The book is quite simply delightful to read. It is beautifully written, and full of ingenious, subtle, and insightful argumentation. The book displays Peter van Inwagen’s signature combination of elegant and plain prose with philosophical sophistication and rigor. Anyone interested in the problem of evil should read this book. In our view, it contains much good sense, not a little wry (and slightly curmudgeonly) humor, and some novel insights into this central problem of philosophy of religion. In what follows, we shall begin by discussing van Inwagen’s fascinating and suggestive views about philosophical methodology. We shall then turn to the global and local arguments from evil. We argue that although van