Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 75–85; March 2002 POLLYANNA REALISM: MORAL PERCEPTION AND MORAL PROPERTIES Michael Watkins and Kelly Dean Jolley I. How Pollyanna Sees Moral Properties Pollyanna reckons that moral properties are subjective, i.e., that the moral properties we perceive actions or persons or characters to have are essentially connected to our interests. She also sides with G. E. Moore and other intuitionists about the perception of moral properties: she judges that such perception is special perception. Further, when Moore (1903) argues that moral properties are simple properties, when he argues that moral properties are neither reducible to, nor identical with, physical properties—when he argues in these ways, Pollyanna vigorously nods her agreement. However, Pollyanna also reckons that moral properties are objective, i.e., that actions or persons or characters have the moral properties they anyway have, independent of our interests. She also judges that we require no otherworldly perceptual abilities to perceive moral properties; and so she judges that perceiving something to be morally good must call more than perceptual abilities into play—it also must call intellectual abilities into play. You may think that Pollyanna must be confused about some of this. You may think that Pollyanna must surrender some of this if she is to be consistent. We do not. In this paper, we draft an account of moral properties and moral perception that gives to Pollyanna everything that she wants. We call the account ‘Pollyanna Realism’, in honour of our heroine. In drafting the account, we begin by exploring the problem of moral perception. We elucidate—and domesticate—the notion of intellectualised perceptual abilities. We argue that Aristotle is right: in a moral matter, the decision may rest with perception (EN 1109b23). But the perception must be the perception of a fit perceiver, fitly perceptive. Being such a perceiver is a matter of being appropriately trained, of acquiring intellectual abilities that augment perceptual ones. We also argue that it is crucial correctly to construe how intellectual abilities augment perceptual ones. Intellectual abilities do not augment perceptual ones by informing perceptions; instead, they augment perceptual abilities by making perceptions (more) informative. We next distinguish identifying conditions from identity conditions. Neglecting to distinguish these makes it seem that Pollyanna must be confused. Moral properties are subjective because the identifying conditions of moral properties involve our interests. Moral properties are objective because the identity conditions of moral properties do not involve our interests. We have a hand in identifying moral properties; we do not have a hand in constituting moral properties. 75