Wojciech Zaluski Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland The Varieties of Egoism. Some Relections on Moral Explanation of Human Action 1. Intentionalist vs. moral explanation of human action The explanation of human action may assume two basic forms. The irst form is morally-neutral and consists in identifying the intention of the agent, i.e., the representation of the goal the agent wanted to at- tain by performing the action (the represented goal is either the state- of affairs to be effected by the action or the action itself if the action’s ultimate goal is the action itself). Of course, the intention of the ac- tion does not have to be morally-neutral but the ‘intentionalist ex- planation’ (as we shall call it) is not primarily focused on providing a moral evaluation of the action; it is primarily focused on identify- ing a speciic mental state ‘generating’ the action, viz. its intention. The second form (which we shall call ‘moral explanation’) is essen- tially different, since it is explicitly morally oriented. It does not aim at identifying the representation of the goal of the action, but at ascer- taining what moral motives (if any) stood behind the action. By moral motives we shall mean motives which directly entail moral evalua- tion (or, in other words, may serve as terms of moral evaluation) and therefore are crucial for the assessment of the moral character of ac- tions to which they give rise. A simple but illuminating (though, as will turn out, requiring some corrections) classiication of such mo- tives will be presented in Section 2; at this stage of our analysis it will sufice to say that the classiication was proposed by Arthur Schopen-