Peter Auriol on Free Choice and Free Judgment * In Vivarium 53 (2015): 65–89. © Brill. Tobias Hoffmann School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America Washington, DC 20064 hoffmann@cua.edu You can request the full article by emailing me. Abstract Some medieval authors defend free choice by arguing that, even though human choices are indeed caused by the practical judgment about what is best to do here and now, one is nevertheless able to freely influence that practical judgment’s formation. This paper examines Peter Auriol’s account of free choice, which is a quite elaborate version of this approach and which brings its theoretical problems into focus. I will argue in favor of Auriol’s basic theory, but I will also propose an emendation to his theory in order to respond to some problems he leaves unresolved. Keywords freedom – free choice – intellect – will – Peter Auriol Medieval thinkers who wanted to defend free choice typically maintained one of two positions: (1) Given the same past up until the moment of practical deliberation, one can deliberate in different ways and arrive at different practical judgments about what is worth choosing. Our choice is free precisely because we can make different practical judgments. I want to become healthy, but I may have different options, for example, having surgery or taking medication. Then my deliberation may conclude that it is best to have surgery, and I am free to choose between the two options because I am free to judge which one is better. This approach posits what I call “judgment leeway.” * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Marquette University, U.C. Irvine, and Loyola Marymount University. I am grateful for the critical remarks received on these occasions. I also wish to thank Bill Duba, Thérèse and David Cory, Gloria Frost, Bonnie Kent, Chris Schabel, and two anonymous readers for their comments.