Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology as Religious Epistemology: A Response to Bobier Joe Milburn 1 Received: 11 December 2014 /Revised: 27 February 2015 /Accepted: 11 March 2015 / Published online: 21 March 2015 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015 Abstract In a recent paper, Christopher Bobier (2014) has argued that Duncan Pritchard’ s(2012) Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) cannot account for knowl- edge that we have through Divine Revelation. This gives philosophers who believe that Divine Revelation can be source of knowledge reason to reject ALVE. Bobier’ s arguments are specifically against ALVE, but they serve as arguments against all sorts of (modest) virtue epistemologies. In this paper then, I will critically examine Bobier’ s argument, and contend that (modest) virtue epistemologies are compatible with knowl- edge through Divine Revelation. Keywords Anti-luck virtue epistemology . Religious epistemology . Divine revelation Bobier argues against anti-luck virtue epistemology by having us consider two different cases in which an epistemic agent dreams that a being speaks, claiming to be the creator of the universe; as a result the epistemic agent believes that God exists. Both cases are stipulated to be the same in every way except that in the one case God is divinely revealing himself to the dreamer, whereas in the other case, the epistemic agent is merely dreaming (Bobier 2014, 311–312). Bobier claims that in the case of divine revelation, one has knowledge that God exists on the basis of the dream; in the other case, in which one is merely dreaming, one might have a true belief, but his belief is not an instance of knowledge. Philosophia (2015) 43:427–434 DOI 10.1007/s11406-015-9592-8 * Joe Milburn jcm55@pitt.edu 1 Philosophy Department, The University of Pittsburgh, 1001 C. Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA