Relevant Information and Relevant Questions: Comment on Floridi’s ‘‘Understanding Epistemic Relevance’’ Patrick Allo Received: 14 May 2013 / Accepted: 20 September 2013 / Published online: 5 October 2013 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Abstract Floridi’s chapter on relevant information bridges the analysis of ‘‘being informed’’ with the analysis of knowledge as ‘‘relevant information that is accounted for’’ by analysing subjective or epistemic relevance in terms of the questions that an agent might ask in certain circumstances. In this paper, I scrutinise this analysis, identify a number of problems with it, and finally propose an improvement. By way of epilogue, I offer some more general remarks on the relation between (bounded) rationality, the need to ask the right questions, and the ability to ask the right questions. Keywords Subjective relevance Semantic information Questions Erotetic logic (Bounded) rationality Prologue: Why Relevance? Floridi’s chapter on relevant information bridges the analysis of ‘‘being informed’’ (which itself depends on a theory of strongly semantic information, and presupposes an analysis of semantic information that encapsulates truth) with the analysis of knowledge as ‘‘relevant information that is accounted for.’’ Yet, unlike the work that precedes the development of a theory of subjective relevance, and unlike the work that depends on such a theory, the proposed analysis of relevant information in terms of what an agent might ask, were he or she informed of the availability of a certain piece of information, looks rather uncontroversial. It doesn’t spark a controversy—as the veridicality thesis did—or even contain an implicit critique on the present state of a discipline—as the network theory of account does for mainstream (post-Gettier) epistemology. All we find is a certain amount of P. Allo (&) Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: patrick.allo@vub.ac.be 123 Minds & Machines (2014) 24:71–83 DOI 10.1007/s11023-013-9325-3 Author's personal copy