Research Articles Oil, domestic conflict, and opportunities for democratization Jeff D Colgan Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University Abstract The resource curse literature suggests two stylized facts about oil-producing states (‘petrostates’) that are not easily reconciled with each other. On one hand, petrostates experience more frequent civil wars than non-petrostates. On the other hand, petrostates have more robust and long-lasting autocratic regimes. This is puzzling because one might expect that one form of instability would lead to the other, as is typical in non-petrostates. If petrostates are more prone to domestic conflict than non-petrostates, and conflicts are opportunities for regime transition and democra- tization, why do we not observe such transitions more frequently in petrostates? I argue that despite frequent con- flicts, rebels rarely succeed in violently overthrowing a petrostate regime or otherwise forcing regime transition. This is because oil generates financial resources that can be used by both an incumbent government and rebels to fund armed conflict, and an incumbent government typically has greater access to these resources. In an analysis of non- democracies for 1946–2004, I also find that oil inhibits democratization in petrostates, but only in the context of violent domestic conflicts. Peaceful pathways to democracy remain open in petrostates. These findings significantly alter our understanding of resource curse. Many scholars argue that oil inhibits democracy because of rentier politics, but this standard interpretation is incomplete. Oil appears to inhibit democratization only in the context of violent domestic conflicts. Ten of the eleven transitions to democracy in petrostates since 1945 occurred without significant domestic conflict. Keywords civil war, democratization, oil, resource curse Introduction The resource curse literature suggests two stylized facts about oil-producing states that are not easily reconciled with each other. On one hand, oil-producing states (‘pet- rostates’) experience more frequent civil wars – or more broadly, violent domestic conflicts – than non- petrostates (Ross, 2004a,b, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Smith, 2008; Hum- phreys, 2005; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009; Lujala, 2010; for a dissenting view see Smith, 2004). On the other hand, petrostates are widely believed to have more robust autocratic regimes than non-petrostates, in the sense of long regime duration and a low rate of democra- tization (Ross, 2001, 2012; Andersen & Aslaksen, 2013; Bellin, 2004; Dunning, 2008; Morrison, 2009; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Goldberg, Wibbels & Mvukiyehe, 2008; for dissenting views, see Haber & Menaldo, 2011; Herb, 1999). Thus existing research suggests that oil generates stability in one sense (i.e. persistent autocratic regimes) while simultaneously generating instability in another sense (i.e. frequent violent rebellions). This is puzzling because it seems reasonable to expect that one form of instability would lead to the other. As this article demonstrates, a regime transition is generally more likely in the wake of violent domestic conflict. A regime transition is defined as a significant change in the political structures and practices of a state which affects the powers and/or the selection process of the executive leader. Regime transition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratization. Violent domestic conflict is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for regime Corresponding author: Jeff_Colgan@brown.edu Journal of Peace Research 2015, Vol. 52(1) 3–16 ª The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0022343314545526 jpr.sagepub.com by guest on January 10, 2015 jpr.sagepub.com Downloaded from