Do we represent intentional action as recursively embedded? The answer must be empirical. A comment on Vicari and Adenzato (2014) Mauricio D. Martins a,b,c,⇑ , W. Tecumseh Fitch a,1 a Department of Cognitive Biology, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria b Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt University, 10117 Berlin, Germany c Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany article info Article history: Received 15 May 2015 Revised 8 October 2015 Accepted 10 October 2015 Keywords: Intentionality Recursion Language abstract The relationship between linguistic syntax and action planning is of considerable interest in cognitive science because many researchers suggest that ‘‘motor syntax” shares certain key traits with language. In a recent manuscript in this journal, Vicari and Adenzato (henceforth VA) critiqued Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch’s 2002 (henceforth HCF’s) hypothesis that recursion is language-specific, and that its usage in other domains is parasitic on language resources. VA’s main argument is that HCF’s hypothesis is falsified by the fact that recursion typifies the structure of intentional action, and recursion in the domain of action is independent of language. Here, we argue that VA’s argument is incomplete, and that their formalism can be contrasted with alternative frameworks that are equally consistent with existing data. Therefore their conclusions are premature without further empirical testing and support. In particular, to accept VA’s argument it would be necessary to demon- strate both that humans in fact represent self-embedding in the structure of intentional action, and that language is not used to construct these representations. Ó 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc. 1. Introduction In 1951, Lashley published a justly famous exposition of an idea that has been repeated and refined in much subsequent research: that there is some fundamental cognitive link between the structure of complex motor plans, and the structures of linguistic syntax (Lashley, 1951). Particularly since the discovery of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), this notion has entered the mainstream of thought in cognitive science. However, there is considerable variation among researchers about what the specific relevant parallels are (compare, for example, (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) and (Pulvermüller, 2010)) along with considerable skepticism about whether these links are deep and interesting (Anscombe, 1957, 1965; Moro, 2014; Toni, de Lange, Noordzij, & Hagoort, 2008). Elsewhere, we have offered our own perspective on this question, hearkening back to Lashley’s ideas that hierarchical organization is the key shared characteristic between action, music and language (Fitch & Martins, 2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.10.003 1053-8100/Ó 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc. ⇑ Corresponding author at: Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Luisenstrasse 56, 10117 Berlin, Germany. E-mail address: diasmarm@hu-berlin.de (M.D. Martins). 1 Address: Department of Cognitive Biology, Althanstrasse 14, 1090 Vienna, Austria. Consciousness and Cognition 38 (2015) 16–21 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog