GENEROCENTRISM: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF DAVID HEYD GENEROCENTRISM: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF DAVID HEYD THOMAS S. PETERSEN 1. INTRODUCTION Many participants in the moral discussion of e.g. assisted reproduction accept that the interests ~ the child would have if it were brought into existence should be taken into account? Is this view correct? In his book Genethics: Moral lssues in the Creation of People David Heyd has argued for a position which entails the view that we do not have to worry about the interests of the child we may bring into existence. He calls his position 'generocentrism' and it is "essentially the thesis that genesis choices can and should be quided exclusively by reference to the interests, welfare, ideals, rights, and duties of those making the choices, the generators, the creators, or the procreators." In other words generocentrism is a specific version of a person-affecting theory of value, which claims that in the moral assessment of reproductive decisions we cannot and therefore should not take into account the interests of people we can decide to bring into existence (these people will in the following be called possible people). In making moral choices we need only be concerned with the interests of actual people. They alone can be affected for better or worse. 3 The aim of this paper is to discuss critically Heyd's generocentrism. In Section 2, the way Heyd draws the distinction between actual and possible people will be described. In Section 3, generocentrism will be criticised on the grounds that it has unacceptable moral implications. Finally, in Section 4, Heyd's arguments in favour of genrocentrism which holds that we cannot coherently take into account the interests of possible people will be criticised. The importance of the question of whether we chould in some way be concerned with the effect reproductive decisions have on our offspring is 411