Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy Vol. 10, No. 1, 3–27, March 2007 ISSN 1369-8230 Print/1743-8772 Online/07/010003-25 © 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13698230601122362 Rousseau’s Rome and the Repudiation of Populist Republicanism JOHN. P. MCCORMICK Political Science Department, University of Chicago, USA Taylor and Francis Ltd FCRI_A_212169.sgm 10.1080/13698230601122362 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1369-8230 (print)/1743-8772 (online) Original Article 2007 Taylor & Francis 10 1 000000March 2007 JohnMcCormick jpmccorm@uchicago.edu ABSTRACT The chapters of Rousseau’s Social Contract devoted to republican Rome prescribe institutions that obstruct popular efforts at diminishing the excessive power and influence of wealthy citizens and political magistrates. I argue that Rousseau reconstructs ancient Rome’s constitution in direct opposition to the more populist and anti-elitist model of the Roman Republic championed by Machiavelli in the Discourses : Rousseau eschews the establishment of magistracies, like the tribunes, reserved for common citizens exclusively, and endorses assemblies where the wealthy are empowered to outvote the poor in lawmaking and elections. On the basis of sociologically anonymous principles like generality and popu- lar sovereignty, and by confining elite accountability to general elections, Rousseau’s neo- Roman institutional proposals aim to pacify the contestation of class hierarchies and inflate elite prerogative within republics – under the cover of more formal, seemingly more genuine, equality. KEY WORDS: Rousseau, Machiavelli, Roman republic, democratic theory, republicanism The few always behave in the mode of the few. Niccolò Machiavelli What the smallest number had decided passed for a decision of the multitude. Jean-Jacques Rousseau Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings have inspired democratic theorists and activists for centuries. Yet, at crucial if neglected junctures of his political magnum opus, Rousseau fairly explicitly prescribes institutions that enable rather than constrain the prerogative of elites within republics and popular governments. This essay demon- strates that the chapters of the Social Contract 1 devoted to the Roman Republic Correspondence Address: Political Science Department, University of Chicago, 5828 South University Ave., Chicago, IL 60637, USA. Email: jpmccorm@uchicago.edu