ARSR 22.3 (2009): 324-344 ARSR (print) ISSN 1031-2943 doi: 10.1558/arsr.v22i3.324 ARSR (online) ISSN 1744-9014 © Equinox Publishing Ltd 2010, 1 Chelsea Manor Studios, Flood Street, London SW3 5SR. Tolerating Religious ‘Others’: Some Thoughts on Secular Neutrality and Religious Tolerance in Australia Holly Randell-Moon Macquarie University Abstract In this paper, I examine the assumptions that underpin secular neutrality and how they might block government attention to religious inequality and religious discrimination in Australian society. The basis for the Australian state’s secular neutrality is that religious belief is a private and individual choice. Individual religious freedom is therefore protected by the mainten- ance of a neutral and secular law. This model of secular neutrality results in the scrutiny of religion as an individual practice, which has implications for the ways in which the state deals with religious discrimination. In construct- ing the state as a neutral arbiter between religious individuals, the legal and political operation of secularism works to conceal the religious values embedded in governmental and political institutions. Although operating from institutions which involve religious rituals, the state’s neutrality can also potentially prohibit these institutions from addressing religious inequa- lity by avoiding religious matters in the name of neutrality. Introduction In this paper, I examine the assumptions that underpin secular neutrality and how they might block government attention to religious inequality and religious discrimination in Australian society. According to secular ideals of neutrality, the state should neither privilege nor discriminate against any one particular religion. In doing so, the state is able to main- tain a public and universal law that is separate from religion, which is seen to be a private, individual matter. In this way it can be said that the state’s neutrality towards religious matters fosters individual religious