Competing for the Platform: The Politics of Interest Group Influence on Political Party Platforms Gina Yannitell Reinhardt, Texas A&M University Jennifer Nicoll Victor, University of Pittsburgh 1 Prepared for the 105th Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association Toronto, Ontario, September 3-6, 2009 Overview We use a formal model to explain the conditions under which political parties will incorporate interest group positions onto the party platform. We test the model’s implications using content analysis of 1996, 2000, and 2004 DNC party platforms and platform hearing testimony. Abstract While parties view interest groups as a means to mobilize voters, interest groups view parties and their platforms as a means to articulate interests. We demonstrate the conditions under which parties will articulate an organized interest group’s preferred positions in its quadrennial platform. A formal theoretical model predicts that parties will reward groups that can mobilize voters, as evidenced by a group’s resources, loyalty to the party, and ideological similarity to the party status quo. We test the formal model using content analysis on three years of DNC platforms and group testimony. Results show that parties reward loyal groups that are ideologically near the party, but that resources have no effect. The authors wish to thank Malory Grossman, Kaitlyn Karsin, Kyle Craig, Alecia Dyer, Jana Stec, DaeJoong Kim, Andrea Volkens, and the Democratic National Committee for providing research assistance, data, and documents. 1 Author order is alphabetical. Both authors have contributed equally to the final product of this paper.