The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 61, No. 4, December 2001 (2001) PHANTASIES, NEUROTIC-BELIEFS, AND BELIEFS-PROPER Linda A. W. Brakel This paper presents a philosophical analysis of three cognitive states familiar and important to psychoanalysts—phantasy, neurotic-belief, and belief-proper. It explores the differences among these three propositional attitudes and finds that the development of secondary process capacities of reality testing and truth directness out of earlier primary process operations (them- selves prior to considerations of truth or falsity) plays a crucial role. Difficulties in the proper typing of cognitive states are discussed, as are the consequences of such confounds. This use of a philosophical method serves to sharpen the familiar psychoanalytic clinical concepts of phantasy and neurotic-belief. In addition, these same clinical concepts, once properly speci- fied, have much to offer the philosophy of mind, where current understanding of representa- tional cognitive states is restricted to those that are largely conscious and rational. When psychoanalytic concepts such as phantasy and neurotic-belief can be better integrated within the discipline of philosophy of mind, both philosophers and psychoanalysts will have a more complete and adequate theory of mind. KEY WORDS: primary process; philosophy of mind; belief; phantasy; unconscious. INTRODUCTION Beliefs, according to most philosophers of mind, are cognitive states that take the form of propositional attitudes. But we can recognize three distinct propositional attitude types, all best considered “beliefs.” Beliefs of the first type have strict technical criteria that derive from a modern philosophy of mind viewpoint. Thus, the “beliefs-proper” of this sort are those proposi- tional attitudes that are reality tested and truth directed. Beliefs-proper are held or dropped as reality testing brings evidence for or against the belief. While one can hold a false belief-proper, and thereby believe falsely, one cannot knowingly do so. The second type of belief, perhaps best typified by religious beliefs, can- not be reality tested. As there can never be sufficient evidence accrued to know this sort of belief as true or false, one can hold it indefinitely, or Linda A. W. Brakel, M.D. is on the faculty, Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan, and the Michigan Psychoanalytic Institute. Address correspondence to Linda Brakel, M.D., 525 Third Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48103. 363 0002-9548/01/1200-0363$19.50/1  2001 Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis