Dissociation in self-narrative q Shaun Gallagher a,b,⇑ , Jonathan Cole c a Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences, Institute of Simulation and Training, University of Central Florida, United States b School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, United Kingdom c Poole Hospital and Centre for Postgraduate Medical Research and Education, University of Bournemouth, United Kingdom article info Article history: Received 2 October 2010 Available online 5 November 2010 Keywords: Narrative Narrative distance Dissociation Psychopathology Syntax abstract We review different analytic approaches to narratives by those with psychopathological conditions, and we suggest that the interpretation of such narratives are complicated by a variety of phenomenological and hermeneutical considerations. We summarize an empirical study of narrative distance in narratives by non-pathological subjects, and dis- cuss how the results can be interpreted in two different ways with regard to the issue of dissociation. Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Narratives by those with psychopathological conditions What is the relation between our thoughts and feelings, and the varying degrees of their embodied expression in posture, gesture facial expression (in relation to emotions particularly), and linguistic expression (both talking to oneself and to oth- ers)? How one presents oneself and one’s feelings and thoughts to another is extraordinarily complex, and depends on many factors; age, sex, mood, power relations, and culture to name but a few. What language one uses is constrained by these fac- tors, but also allows for the possibility of attempting straightforward veracity, or dissemblance and deception, as well as the use of various linguistic devices such as irony, humor, and sarcasm. Mood and affect are also communicated through gesture, posture and prosody of voice. Of course much interpersonal expression is ephemeral; body language and prosody may be potent communication chan- nels but without video or film are lost as moments past. In contrast the written language, as seen in narrative, endures. With- in medicine and especially neurology there is a classic tradition of examining narrative accounts of living with conditions, from Weir Mitchell to Luria and Sacks. In these writers’ work are found extraordinarily rich narratives of brain damage, aut- ism, aphasia, and blindness, for example. Yet rarely are these accounts, taken from the patients themselves, questioned in regard to their narrative structure; rather – where relevant – this is taken into account as required, say in aphasia in order to understand it and portray it to others. It seems clear, however, that certain conditions, of themselves, may affect the range of narrative possible to a given pa- tient. If we, simplifying for the moment, distinguish the various parts which make up an expressive narrative then it might include the expressed thoughts, feelings, and experiential world, altered by a given condition, and the linguistic and embod- ied expressive channels through which experience is communicated. In some narratives of neurological patients the latter is 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.003 q This article is part of a special issue of this journal on Brain and Self: Bridging the Gap. ⇑ Corresponding author at: Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences, Institute of Simulation and Training, University of Central Florida, USA. Fax: +1 407 823 6658. E-mail addresses: gallaghr@mail.ucf.edu (S. Gallagher), jonathan@colefamily.org.uk (J. Cole). Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2011) 149–155 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog